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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last 100 years, the United States has developed what is
commonly referred to as a "dual banking system."' Under this system, a bank is chartered, examined, and regulated as either a national
bank, under the National Bank Act,2 or as a state chartered bank under
any one of fifty different state banking laws. 3
1. See generally Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking System, 19
(detailing the history of the United States banking
industry). For a general history of commercial banking, see BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER,
COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY (1974); JAMES J. WHITE,
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993)

TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW

1-34 (1976); see also Melanie L. Fein, The

FragmentedDepository Institutions System: A Case for Unification, 29 AM. U. L. REV.
633 (1980) (discussing regulation of depository institutions).
2. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)) (repealing the National Bank Act of
1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665).
3. See Symons, supra note 1, at 9. Depository institutions can also be regulated
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State chartered banks ("State Banks") have traditionally been an
important part of the dual banking system, often leading the way in
banking innovations.4 State banking regulators have also developed
new approaches for regulating and examining financial institutions.5
Finally, State Banks provide state legislatures with a degree of control
over their banking systems that the state legislatures do not have over
national banking associations chartered by the federal government
("National Banks").6
During the last decade, however, State Banks have experienced
difficulty in remaining competitive with National Banks. The primary
impetus for this lack of competitiveness is the increasingly broad
powers granted to National Banks by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (the "OCC"), which has allowed National Banks to
engage in non-traditional banking activities such as financial derivatives and insurance brokerage.
An obvious solution for State Banks would be to increase their
powers to correspond to those enjoyed by National Banks. State
legislatures have attempted to speed up that process by passing "wild
card" or "parity" statutes. A "wild card" or "parity" statute enables a
state banking regulator to grant a State Bank the same banking powers
enjoyed by a National Bank. These statutes provide an efficient, fast,
and flexible tool for state banking regulators to expand state banking
powers to match those granted to National Banks.7 A number of
obstacles, however, have prevented state legislatures and banking
regulators from taking full advantage of wild card statutes, including:
(1) safety and soundness considerations; (2) bureaucratic inertia; and
(3) limitations potentially imposed by state laws.
This Article proposes that judicious use of "wild card" statutes
would provide state banking regulators with the powers necessary to
enable their State Banks to compete on an equal footing with National
Banks without endangering the institutions' safety and soundness.
under other federal regulations. See generally Fein, supra note I (discussing the
regulation of banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and other depository
institutions).
4. See infra part III.A.
5. See infra part III.A.
6. See infra part III.A.
7. State laws utilizing federal laws as a standard for state action are not unknown in
other areas. The most prominent example is a state's "long arm" statute. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (providing that a court "may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution . . . of the United
States"). Other examples include state securities "Blue Sky" laws and state income tax
codes.
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This Article initially discusses the dual banking system in the United
States and the pressures to expand state banking powers.8 This Article
then describes wild card statutes and their current use by state banking
regulators, focusing on the more fruitful areas of wild card
application. 9 It then scrutinizes some potential difficulties in their
application, and proposes a model wild card statute.' ° Finally, this
Article concludes that State Banks can remain competitive with
National Banks."
To ensure this outcome, however, State Banks must urge their
banking regulators to utilize the powers provided by their respective
wild card statutes. Additionally, State Banks must encourage state
legislatures to clarify the activities authorized thereunder.
H. THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM AND BANKING POWERS
A. Generally
The dual banking system in the United States is a complex historical
outgrowth of state and federal regulations governing commercial
banks.' 2 The result is a system in which two commercial banks can
service the same customers, be the same size and be located in the
same city, and yet be authorized to exercise different banking powers.
As of the end of 1993, approximately 11,300 commercial banks
held approximately $3.9 trillion in assets and $3.0 trillion in
deposits.' 3 Roughly 8,000 of these commercial banks were State
Banks, holding $1.8 trillion of the assets and $1.4 trillion of the
deposits. 4 The remaining 3,300 commercial banks were National
Banks holding $2.1 trillion in assets and $1.6 trillion in deposits.' 5
The end result of the dual banking system is a non-uniform system
in which commercial banks may enjoy different banking powers

8. See infra parts II and III.
9. See infra parts IV and V.
10. See infra parts VI and VII.
11. See infra part VIII.
12. Unless otherwise indicated, "commercial bank(s)" includes both commercial
banks and savings banks, but excludes savings and loan institutions, investment banks,
and other depository or nondepository institutions. A discussion of the effect of wild
card statutes on these other non-bank financial institutions is beyond the scope of this
Article.
13. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, THE STATE OF THE STATE BANKING
SYSTEM 7-8 & figs. 1-3 (1994).

14. See id.
15. See id.
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6
depending upon whether they are state or federally chartered.'
Compounding this complexity is the fact that both federal and state
banks are subject to a patchwork of laws and regucommercial
17
lations.

B. NationalBanking Powers
National Banks have existed in one form or another since the
founding of the United States.' 8 National Banks did not become a
fixture of the American banking system, however, until Congress
provided for the chartering of National Banks under the National Bank
Act of 1864.'9 Although subject to significant revision and amendment since that time, the National Bank Act continues to govern
National Banks.20

16. See ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? (1987); see also Kenneth E.

Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1977) ("[Ilt should be evident that the existence of 51 lawmaking bodies in
addition to the federal government has created great diversity among the powers
conferred on banks and the restrictions imposed on them.").
17. Commentators continue to lament the state of the United States' regulation of
financial institutions:
Nevertheless, we continue the vestigial debates about such parochial matters
as the dual banking system, branching, interstate banking, and section 4(c)(8)
bank holding company powers and restrictions. These and other topics still
dominate the financial and depository scene here in the United States, bearing
little or no relationship to the realities of the financial world at large.
Paul Nelson, Banking Regulation in the Nineties: Fighting Tomorrow's Battles with
Yesterday's Tools, 9 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 369, 370 (1990) (footnote omitted).
18. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS INAMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO

THE CIVIL WAR 720-25 (1957). The federal government chartered two National Banks
between 1791 and 1816, although both charters were eventually repealed. See Symons,
supra note 1, at 6-7. For a discussion of the history of the First and Second Bank of the
United States, see HAMMOND, supra, and Symons, supra note 1, at 6-7. The nation's first
bank was actually the Bank of North America, chartered by the Confederation Congress
in 1781. See HAMMOND, supra, at 48-51. The Bank of North America subsequently
obtained a state charter from Pennsylvania in 1782. Id.
19. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (repealing the National Bank Act of
1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665). Congress appears to have modeled the National Bank Act
on various state bank chartering laws, particularly the New York Free Banking Act of
1838. See Edward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 689-90 (1983).
20. In certain matters, however, Congress and the courts have defaulted to state law.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 92a(f), (i) (1988) (mandating that trust department operations
must not contravene state law); id. § 36(c) (branching); First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri,
263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) (explaining that state law governs National Banks to the
extent that it does not conflict with federal statutes, discriminate against National
Banks, or unduly burden their operation).
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National Banks are regulated by the OCC, an office within the
United States Treasury Department. 2' The OCC is specifically empowered to charter National Banks, 22 examine them, 23 and promulgate
regulations governing them. 24 Courts have been reluctant to disturb
OCC decisions because of the broad delegation of authority granted to
the OCC by Congress in the National Bank Act. 2
Section 24 of the National Bank Act enumerates the powers granted
to National Banks to conduct a banking business, including the power
to engage in activities incidental to the business of banking.26 A
National Bank must obtain the express consent of the OCC before it
may engage in activities not expressly provided for in either statute or
regulation. Most of the growth in the powers of National Banks has
been based upon the incidental banking power provided by the National Bank Act.28 Congress, in contrast, has expressly granted few
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2226-27, 2241.
22. Id. § 27 (1988), as amended by Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2227.
23. Id. §§ 26, 481 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The OCC is expressly precluded from
examining state member banks, regardless of any affiliation with a National Bank. See
id. § 481.
24. Id. § 93a (1988).
25. See Michael P. Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality:
Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61
TEMP. L. REV. 723, 733-36, 771-77 (1988); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 610 F.2d
1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing the Comptroller's wide discretion);
Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 935 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing that the
OCC has primary responsibility for interpreting the statute), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939
(1986).
26. Section 24 provides as follows:
[A] national banking association ... shall have power . . . to exercise . . . all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security;
and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions
of title 62 of the Revised Statutes. The business of dealing in securities and
stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such
securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the association
shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; Provided, That the
association may purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by
regulation prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
27. Id.; see id. § 92a (1988).
28. Judicial and administrative rulings have identified 80 specific activities that are
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new powers.29
C. State Banking Powers
States also have authorized the chartering of banks since the
founding of the United States.30 Each of the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, has its own particular banking act providing for the authorization, chartering, regulation, and examination of
its State Banks.3 ' Because of this disparity, "[v]olumes could be
written about the lack of uniformity among the [state banking] laws of
the fifty states. 32
State banking statutes typically grant State Banks the power to
engage in general banking business and to engage in activities
generally related or incidental to the banking business. As is the case
with National Banks, State Banks generally are not permitted to
engage in an activity that is not specifically enumerated. 34 The Illinois
Supreme Court provided a typical formulation of this rule when it
stated:
considered to be within the parameters of the "banking business" or incidental powers.
1 HARVEY L. PrT ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 16-22.9 (Supp. 1994).
29. For a history of proposed but unpassed federal bank laws since the 1980s, see
Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L. REV.
726 (1992).
30. As one commentator explains:
Until 1837 bank charters were issued only by special legislative acts .... The
State of New York passed the Free Banking Act in 1838 which allowed anyone
to obtain a charter so long as the applicant complied with minimum capital
requirements and submitted to supervision and control. By 1860 eighteen
states adopted free banking.
Fischer, supra note 29, at 733-34 (footnotes omitted).
3 1. For a comprehensive survey of state banking laws and regulation, see
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING (15th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter PROFILE].
32. Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 580
(1966) [hereinafter Hackley Part I]; see Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking
System Part 11, 52 VA. L. REV. 771 (1966). See also Scott, supra note 16, at 20
("Banking has seen none of the standardization associated with, for example, the
Uniform Commercial Code.").
33. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, §§ 5/3, 5/5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
34. See Symons, supra note 1, at 24 ("If an activity is not within the business of
banking, it must be expressly granted by statute to be a bank power."). See generally
Security Trust & Sav. Bank v. Marion County Banking Co., 253 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1971)
(stating that a bank has no right to operate branch banks without statutory
authorization); Independent Ins. Agents v. Department of Banking & Fin., 285 S.E.2d
535 (Ga. 1982) (holding that banks cannot operate insurance agencies under a statutory
grant of "incidental powers"); Iowa Credit Union League v. Iowa Dep't of Banking, 268
N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1978) (finding that credit unions cannot engage in the share-draft
business without express statutory authorization).
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"The rule long recognized and frequently announced by this
court is, that a bank ...

has only such powers as are expressly

conferred by the statute under which it is organized and such
powers as are necessarily implied from the specific grant of
power. Every power that is not clearly granted is withheld.
Enumeration of powers granted implies exclusion of all others,
and any ambiguity in the terms of the grant of power must
operate against the corporation and in favor of the public. If a
power claimed is withheld, the withholding of such
35 power is to
exercise.
its
against
prohibition
a
as
regarded
be
Because a State Bank may not engage in an activity unless such an
activity is expressly approved by statute, State Banks must obtain
express or implicit legislative approval prior to engaging in new
activities.
Although Congress generally permits each of the states to regulate
36
its own State Banks, it has preempted state laws in several respects.
Some examples of federal preemption include the power to regulate
usury rates; 37 the power to extend credit to executive officers,
directors, and "principal persons; '38 and the imposition of uniform
standards with respect to electronic fund transfers.39 One of the most
important state law preemptions provides that State Banks insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") may not
engage in activities not otherwise permitted a National Bank. 4°
D. Other FederalRegulators
Although the OCC and state banking regulators are typically the
primary regulators for commercial banks, both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve Board") and
the FDIC also have regulatory authority over many commercial banks.

35. State Bank v. Benzing, 48 N.E.2d 333, 339 (Ill. 1943) (quoting Knass v.
Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 188 N.E. 836, 840 (Ill. 1933)).
36. This preemption doctrine originated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding that Maryland could not condition the circulation of notes
in Maryland by the Second National Bank on the payment of a stamp tax or annual fee).
37. See 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1988) (preempting usury laws for state institutions for
certain periods of.time).
38. Id. § 375b (Supp. V 1993), as amended by Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2233; id.
§ 18280)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643a-1693r (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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1. The Federal Reserve Board
Under the Federal Reserve Act,4 1 Congress empowered the Federal
Reserve Board to manage the nation's money supply and to supervise
State Banks which are members of the federal reserve system ("State
Member Banks"),42 National Banks, and bank holding companies.43
State Member Banks are subject to examination by both federal and
state bank examiners. 44
State Member Bank status generally does not diminish a bank's
available banking powers under state law. 45 As a condition of membership in the Federal Reserve System, however, the Federal Reserve
Board may prevent a State Bank from later changing the general
character of its business or the scope of its powers without first
obtaining approval from the Federal Reserve Board.46
2. The FDIC
The FDIC exercises residual supervisory authority over National
Banks and State Member Banks.47 The FDIC also directs supervisory
41. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V. 1993)).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988); see also id. § 248 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a
discussion of the Federal Reserve System, see CARTER GOLEMBE & DAVID S. HOLLAND,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING, 1986-87, at 8, 27-31 (1986); WHITE, supra note 1, at
45-65; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and
Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 841-51
(1989). The Federal Reserve Board is also authorized to establish reserve requirements
for all federally-chartered or federally-insured depository institutions. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
43. The Federal Reserve regulates bank holding companies pursuant to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See
generally F. SOLOMON ET AL., BANKING LAW §§ 86-88 (1995) (discussing the Bank
Holding Company Act). The Federal Reserve Board also permits bank holding
companies to exercise powers that are closely related to the business of banking. See 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). A discussion of the activities and powers authorized for
bank holding companies is beyond the scope of this Article.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 483 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45. Id. § 330 (Supp. V 1993) ("[Any bank becoming a member of the Federal reserve
system shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a State bank . . . and may
continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by the State in which it was
created."). The Federal Reserve's banking regulations can be found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 200299 (1994).
46. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Federal Reserve Board's power to regulate State Banks, see Keith R. Fisher, Federalism
Contra Federal Reservism: Bank Holding Companies and State Bank Powers, 23 U.S.F.
L. REV. 317 (1989) and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers,
the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1191 (1990).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. V 1993). State Member Banks are required to maintain
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authority over State Banks which elect to obtain federal deposit
insurance, even if they are not members of the Federal Reserve System
("State Nonmember Banks")." The FDIC has claimed the authority to
regulate the scope of powers that a State Nonmember Bank may
exercise under Section 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 49 Section 6 requires the FDIC to determine, before approving deposit
insurance, "whether or not [the applying bank's] corporate powers are
consistent with the purpose of [the FDIC Act]."'°
The FDIC is also able to exercise regulatory authority over State
Banks for which it insures deposits ("Insured State Banks") by virtue
of its power to terminate deposit insurance. 5' Justifications for the
FDIC terminating deposit insurance include: (1) determining that an
Insured State Bank has engaged in unsafe or unsound practices 52 or
(2) preventing an Insured State Bank from changing the general
character of its business without FDIC approval.53
The passage of Section 303 of the FDIC Improvement Act of 19914
drastically increased the importance of FDIC regulation with respect to
state banking powers.5 Section 303 generally limits the activities and
equity investments of Insured State Banks to those activities and equity
investments that are permissible for National Banks.56 Section 303,
however, also provides the FDIC with the authority to permit State
Banks to engage in certain banking activities not authorized for National Banks upon a showing that "the activity would pose no
significant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund" and that the
deposit insurance. Id. § 1814 (Supp. V 1993).
48. See id. § 1815 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). There are currently more than 12,000
FDIC-insured banks in the United States. FDIC, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1991).
49. See FDIC, Powers Inconsistent with Purposes of Federal Deposit Insurance Law,
50 Fed. Reg. 23,964, 23,967-68 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 332) (proposed
June 7, 1985); see also Wilmarth, supra note 46, at 1195-1200 (discussing FDIC
regulatory powers regarding expanded banking powers).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (Supp.V 1993).
5 1. See id.§ 1818 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52. Id.§ 1818(a) (Supp. V 1993).
53. 12 C.F.R. § 333.2 (1994).
54. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2349
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter FDICIA].
55. FDICIA, supra note 54, § 303. Two commentators have suggested that this
section may be the beginning of the end of the dual banking system. Kirk K. Van Tine
& Robert G. Boggess II, "Financial Services Modernization:" A Cure for Problem
Banks?, 69 WASH.U. L.Q. 809, 827 (1991).
56. FDICIA, supra note 54, § 303. For a summary of this section, see M. L. FEIN,
FDICIA Imposes New Limits on State Banks, in THE FDIC IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991:
WHAT BANKS AND THRIFTS NEED TO KNOW Now, at 59-67 (PLI Com. Law & Practice

Course Handbook Series No. A4-4375, 1992).
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State Bank is in compliance with applicable capital standards."
The FDIC has issued regulations that provide guidance as to what
constitutes a permissible activity or equity investment by a National
Bank for purposes of Section 303,58 identifying approximately 30
permissible equity investments and 250 permissible activities. In
addition, in at least one instance, the OCC has issued an interpretive
ruling to a State Bank for the purposes of Section 303, to6 confirm that
a particular activity was permissible for a National Bank. 0
The development of the dual banking system has created a banking
regulatory scheme that is not only complex, but is also non-uniform
between National and State Banks. This complexity and non-uniformity is only increased by the overlay of Federal Reserve Board and
FDIC regulation. Because of this, National and State Banks are often
unable to compete fully on an even basis, even though they may be
located in the same city.
III. PRESSURES TO EXPAND STATE BANKING POWERS
A variety of economic and political forces are currently pressuring
state legislatures and banking regulators to expand state banking
powers. The expansion of national banking powers and interstate
banking, coupled with the incentive for states to attract and to retain
banking institutions, provides states with further inducement to look to
such tools as wild card statutes to ensure parity between their State
Banks and National Banks.

57. FDICIA, supra note 54, § 303. This section also provides certain limited
exceptions from this rule, regarding insurance underwriting and equity investments. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 183la(b), (c) (Supp. V 1993).
58. 12 C.F.R. § 362 (1994). For a summary of this regulation see State Bank Powers:
FDIC Sets Boundaries for Controlling State Bank Investment Powers, 12 Banking Pol'y
Rep. (P-H) No. 24, at 7 (Dec. 20, 1993).
59. FDIC, EQUITY INVESTMENTS PERMISSIBLE FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND ACTIVITIES

PERMISSIBLE FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES (1993) [hereinafter FDIC]. For
a summary of the more important National Bank powers listed by the FDIC, see National
Bank Powers: Activities Permissiblefor National Banks, 12 Banking Pol'y Rep. (P-H)
No. 16, at 10 (Aug. 16, 1993).
60. See Letter from William P. Bowden, Jr., Chief Counsel, OCC, to J.P. Morgan &
Co. Inc. (June 30, 1993) (on file with the author) (stating that National Banks may
engage in physical commodity transactions). It is unclear whether the OCC will issue
additional interpretations for purposes of this section.
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The Role of State Banks

Although commentators have repeatedly questioned the value of the
dual banking system, 61 State Banks have historically proven to be an
important source of innovation and development for the banking
industry. State Banks also provide state legislatures with a degree of
control over their banking systems that they do not enjoy with National
Banks. Finally, a state banking charter provides commercial banks
with an alternative regulator to the OCC.
State Banks have historically developed important new services and
innovations in the banking industry in the areas of checking, real estate
lending, branch banking, reserve requirements, and a variety of other
areas. 62 Although state legislatures generally cannot grant banking
powers greater than those enjoyed by National Banks,63 legislatures
and regulators are still able to develop new approaches to the regulation and the examination of their State Banks.
Another important rationale for the existence of State Banks is the
opportunity it provides states to regulate their own financial institutions. Due to the importance of credit and banking for a state's
communities, 64 states have a vested interest in determining how their
financial institutions are examined and regulated. Although a state may
not examine or regulate a National Bank,65 State Banks provide an
opportunity for a state to encourage and to control the development of
banking.
Finally, State Banks provide commercial banks with an alternative
regulator to the OCC. Because a regulator has a tremendous influence
over the operation and business of a commercial bank, the choice
between two banking regulators provides an important check and
balance on arbitrary or capricious regulation by the OCC.'

61. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The
Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1991) (critiquing dual
banking system). Regardless of one's opinion regarding dual banking, there appears to
be little possibility for significant change. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the
Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987) ("Politicians may complain..
., but questioning the underlying premise of the dual banking system has traditionally
been outside the borders of permissible political discourse.").
62. Wilmarth, supra note 46, at 1156.
63. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
64. State banks hold approximately $1.4 trillion in deposits, underscoring their
importance to business communities. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
65. National Banks are examined by the OCC. See supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
66. Scott, supra note 16, at 12; Wilmarth, supra note 46, at 1155.
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B. Expanding NationalBanking Powers
Although the banking industry remains highly regulated, the recent
trend from the federal government since the early 1960s 67 has been to
deregulate National Banks by expanding their banking powers. 6' As
state banking regulators confront this trend, they are faced with the
possibility that the National Banks operating within their states may
enjoy significantly greater banking powers than those enjoyed by their
State Banks.
Beginning in the early 1960s, during James J. Saxon's tenure as
Comptroller of the Currency, the OCC began to permit National Banks
to engage in a growing host of banking activities that were previously
considered impermissible. In 1963, Saxon stated that "[t]here is little
disagreement with the view that commercial banks require greater
latitude in operations if they are to meet current and future needs for
banking services."'69 From 1961 to 1966, the OCC authorized a substantial list of national banking powers: "[N]ational Banks... [were
authorized] ... to establish and operate collective investment funds,
underwrite revenue bonds, operate insurance and travel agencies,
establish operations subsidiaries, open loan production offices without
regard to state branching laws, and offer personal property leasing and
data processing services."7 ° Although many of these earlier authorizations were later reversed,7 ' the OCC has continued to expand
national banking powers. At least one Comptroller following Saxon
67. Three influential articles from the 1960s argued for expanding national bank
powers based upon the incidental banking powers. See Richard S. Beatty, What are the
Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank Services?, 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969);
H. Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A proposal for testing the
propriety of expanding bank services), 85 BANKING L.J. 565 (1968); Ralph F. Huck,
What is the Banking Business?, 21 Bus. LAW. 537 (1966).
68. As one commentator explained:
[T]he trend in Congress and the federal bank agencies has been to emphasize
bank deregulation as a means of promoting a fair and efficient allocation of
capital resources. Deregulation encompasses two objectives, the elimination
of interest ceilings on deposit accounts and the expansion of bank powers to
enhance service competition.
Jeffrey D. Dunn, Comment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and
Judicial Precedent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-SteagallAct, and Bank Holding

Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J. 765, 767 (1982). However, Congress has been almost
absent in any express expansion of national banking powers. See Wilmarth, supra note
46, at 1171-77.
69. James J. Saxon, Bank Expansion and Economic Growth: A New Perspective, 8
ANTITRUST BULL. 597, 599 (July-Aug. 1963). But see Hackley Part I, supra note 32, at
597-632 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board's opposition to such expansion).
70. See Wilmarth, supra note 46, at 1157-58.
71. Id. at 1158 (listing collective investment funds, insurance and travel agencies,
and underwriting revenue bonds).
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has suggested that the only restraint on national banking powers
should be whether or not there is a potential risk to the solvency of the
bank.72
A review of the significant activities and powers expressly granted
by the OCC to National Banks during the last decade alone illustrates
the continued expansion of national banking powers. The OCC now
permits National Banks to trade and to deal in financial derivatives73
and to sell various types of insurance products,74 annuities,75 and
mutual funds.7 6 The OCC also permits National Banks to offer
various non-banking services, 7 to operate common trust funds, 78 and
to permit other businesses to operate on their premises.79
Although state banking powers have expanded in certain areas,8 °
State Banks remain at a disadvantage to National Banks. 8' To reach all
State Banks, fifty different legislatures or regulatory agencies must act,
72. Beatty, supra note 67, at 24 (referring to William Camp, successor to Saxon as
Comptroller of the Currency).
7 3. See infra part V.A.
74. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
76. See National Bank Sale of Units in Unit Investment Trust Under Glass-Steagall
Act, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 363, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,533, at 77,828 (May 23, 1986).
77. See Expansion of Current Messenger Operations, OCC No Objection Letter No.
89-04, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,061, at 71,171
(July 11, 1989); Establishment of Operating Subsidiary Offering Real Estate Appraisal
Services for Bank, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 467, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,691, at 78,086 (Jan. 24, 1989); National Banks Selling
Tax Auditing Representation Services to Customers, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 437,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,661, at 78,042 (July 27,
1988); National Banks Acting as Finders Introducing Potential Buyers of Real Estate to
Sellers, OCC Interpretive Letter, 1987 WL 149774 (Aug. 20, 1987).
78. See Operation of Common Trust Funds, OCC Investment Securities Letter No. 52,
[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,325, at 71,453 (July 26,
1991).
79. See Conduct of Securities Brokerage Business by Unaffiliated Tenants on Bank
Premises, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 533, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,244, at 71,324 (Oct. 5, 1990); Leasing Lobby Space by National
Bank Subsidiary to Travel Agencies, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 399, [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,623, at 77,958 (Oct. 29, 1987).
80. For a discussion of innovations developed by State Banks, see Wilmarth, supra
note 46, at 1177-81. Approximately 41 states permit, to some degree, their State
Banks, either directly or through a subsidiary, to engage in securities brokerage; 17
permit general securities underwriting; 30 permit insurance brokerage; 6 states permit
some insurance underwriting; 27 permit real estate development; 26 permit real estate
equity participation; and 17 permit real estate brokerage. See PROFILE, supra note 31, at
275-76.
81. State Banks, however, may be permitted to engage in certain activities that are
not permissible for National Banks; See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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as opposed to only one-the OCC-for National Banks. Laws or
rules passed or adopted by the various states are often non-uniform, 2
and even if the same or similar language is used, it may still be subject
to varying interpretations. One commentator has noted that "allowing
bank powers to expand only on a state-by-state basis will result in
non-uniformity and legal uncertainty. 83
C. PoliticalPressures
Differences between state and national banking powers place
political pressures on state banking regulators to expand state banking
powers. 84 Even the current Comptroller of the Currency has acknowledged these realities, noting that "It]he decision on what kind of
charter a bank wants is purely a business decision, and banks are free
to choose whichever regulator they think will give them the best deal
for whatever reason. 85 State Banks often request permission from
their banking regulators to exercise the same banking powers as those
enjoyed by National Banks.86 Banking regulators may become
concerned that a failure to grant State Bank requests might lead a State
Bank to convert to a National Bank charter. 87 The conversion of even
one major bank can alter the dynamics of a state banking department.88
State bank regulators also strive to ensure that their State Banks
remain competitive as a means of persuading National Banks to convert to a state charter. 89 The conversion of a National Bank to a State
82. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
83. Paul Tannenbaum, Note, Banking Reform and State Law Preemption, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 811, 837 (1992).
84. See Scott, supra note 16, at 36 (generally discussing competition among banking
agencies and its effect on the dual banking system); Symons, supra note 1, at 23 ("At
various times one regulator has displayed a greater willingness to change, with the result
being that the different approach of another regulator has turned out to be valuable and
subsequently adopted by other bank agencies."). But see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R.
Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
677, 706 (1988) (arguing "against the notion that there is effective competition among
regulators.").
85. Steven Lipin, Continental Bank Is Seeking to Change to State Regulator, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at B6B (quoting Eugene Ludwig, current Comptroller of the
Currency).
86. Almost all wild card statutes require State Banks to obtain permission from the
regulator to engage in wild card activity. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
87. One commentator suggested this was one of the primary motivations for passing
wild card statutes. See Scott, supra note 16, at 36.
88. The conversion of Wells Fargo Bank from a California State Bank to a National
Bank reduced the California State Banking Department revenues by 30%. See id. at 31.
Chase Manhattan Bank's conversion to a National Bank in 1965 created similar
pressures. Id.
89. See Dean Calbreath, Vexed by Regulators, Bank Will Switch to State Charter,SAN
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Bank could result in added prestige, funding, and staff for a state
banking authority. 90
Thus, historical evidence suggests that ignoring such political
pressures could prove problematic for a state banking system. During
James Saxon's brief tenure as Comptroller, a strong conversion trend
in favor of National Banks clearlyZ emerged, forcing state banking
regulators and legislatures to adapt.
D. Legislative Inertia
State banking regulators also face difficulties in convincing
legislators to pass legislation on a timely basis in order to maintain
parity of state banking powers with expanding national banking
powers. 92 Legislators may not meet frequently enough, and the
number of changes that would be necessary to equalize the treatment
may be too much to legislate on a timely basis. Although legislatures
may eventually respond to a need to expand a particular banking
power, their response may occur months or even years after National
Banks began to exercise that power.

FRANCISCO Bus. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at 6; Steve Klinkerman, Continental Files to Do
U.S.-State Charter Flip, AM. BANKER, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1 (stating that Continental
Bank estimates it would save over one million dollars annually in examination fees by
converting to a state charter); P. Thomas Parrish, Five Reasons to Get a State Charter,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 24, 1992, at 4.
Continental Bank, Marine Midland, and Key Bank have recently converted from
national to state banking charters. See Lipin, supra note 85, at B6B (discussing
Continental Bank and Marine Midland conversions); cf. R.. Meredith, Wells Planned
Switch to a Thrift Charter: DroppedIdea When Regulators Balked, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29,
1993, at 1 (relating that Wells Fargo, a National Bank, has even considered switching to
a Thrift Charter). Some suggest that the recent conversion of Continental and Marine
Midland to state charters "'may represent the start of a trend in which large institutions
seek greater comfort with state banking regulators."' See Klinkerman, supra, at I
(quoting Thomas Brooks, a partner at Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz).
90. State Banks typically pay for the examination costs of their state banking
regulator. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/48(3) (West Supp. 1994)
(providing a fee schedule).
91. See Scott, supra note 16, at 23-30.
92. Commentators have suggested that this legislative inertia has been one of the
primary motivations behind the passage of wild card statutes. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra
note 43, at 4-23; Butler & Macey, supra note 84, at 705-06 ("State legislatures ... have
apparently enacted these statutes to provide themselves with a means of responding to
changes in national bank powers that may occur while the legislature is not in
session."); Scott, supra note 16, at 36 (stating that wild card statutes eliminate the
"vicissitudes and costs of the legislative process").
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E. InterstateBanking
The continual expansion of interstate banking adds pressure on state
banking regulators to expand state banking powers. Thirty-eight states
currently permit nationwide interstate banking,93 with five states
approving interstate branching.94 On the federal level, interstate
banking may already be a reality, 95 even without considering interstate
banking legislation recently passed by Congress.'
Empirical studies suggest that interstate banking and branching will
bring about greater competition and consolidation in the banking
industry, 97 although small institutions will continue to compete
effectively.98 State regulators, however, will be under continuing
pressure to authorize banking powers similar to those enjoyed by
National Banks and by State Banks chartered in other states which
enter their markets as a result of interstate banking. As large holding
companies and National Banks cross state lines, State Banks will face
competition capable of exercising national banking powers. 99
93. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 13, at 16-17.
94. Id. Interstate banking generally refers to a bank holding company chartering
more than one bank in different states. Interstate branching refers to a bank setting up a
branch in another state. See David F. Freeman, Interstate Banking Restrictions Under
the McFadden Act, 72 VA. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1986) (discussing branching); Helen R.
Friedli, Changing Times in Interstate Banking, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 97 (1986)
(discussing interstate banking).
95. Robert G. Ballen & Joseph P. Savage, Interstate Bank Branching: Are the Walls
Starting to Crumble?, 111 BANKING L.J. 149 (1994) (summarizing direct and indirect
branch banking by National Banks); see also First Fidelity Bank, N.A., Philadelphia,
Pa. & First Fidelity Bank, N.A., Newark, N.J., OCC Corporate Decision No. 94-04,
[1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,644, at 83,967 (Jan. 10,
1994) (approving merger resulting in branches in two adjacent states); American Sec.
Bank, N.A., Washington, D.C. & Maryland Nat'l Bank, Baltimore, Md., OCC Corporate
Decision No. 94-05, [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,695,
at 84,266 (Feb. 4, 1994) (same).
96. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, § 101(a), 108 Stat. 2338 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
97. See Jeffrey D. Ayers & Gary L. Jones, Empirical Research Project, Regional
Banking-A Viable Alternative? An Empirical Study, 9 J. CORP. L. 815, 834-35
(1984); Donald R. Fraser, Structural and Competitive Implications of Interstate
Banking, 9 J. CORP. L. 643, 649-53 (1984) (summarizing studies discussing
consolidation of interstate banking industry).
98. See Ayers & Jones, supra note 97, at 838-40 (citing evidence from other states
where well-managed small institutions continue to compete effectively despite branch
banking, and arguing that small institutions' "established position in the community
gives them a decided competitive advantage over possible new entrants").
99. For example, BankAmerica Corporation, a bank holding company with a net
worth of approximately $200 billion, currently controls National Banks in Alaska,
Idaho, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and California. BANKAMERICA CORP., 1992
ANNUAL REPORT 71 (1993). Drawing on resources from the holding company, each of
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WILD CARD STATUTES

Wild card statutes present a potential solution to many of the
pressures and the problems facing state banking regulators and legislators. Such statutes have the potential to enable State Banks to enter
into derivatives, insurance, and other banking powers currently
enjoyed primarily by National Banks.tu Surprisingly, although many
state legislatures have passed wild card statutes, regulators generally
have failed to take advantage of these statutes.
A. Generally
States first began to pass a significant number of wild card statutes
in the 1960s,' 0 ' in response to Comptroller of the Currency James
Saxon's efforts to expand national banking powers." 2 Alaska, for
example, adopted the current formulation of its wild card statute in
order "to provide the [Alaska department of banking] with the flexibility necessary to allow the state banking system to keep pace with
new developments in the federal system."' 3

these National Bank subsidiaries is potentially capable of exercising any or all of the
national banking powers exercised by the others. For a list of the potential activities
permitted a National Bank, see FDIC, supra note 59.
100. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for the broad powers expressly
granted to National Banks by the OCC.
101. 1961 11. Laws 2361 (codified as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205,
§ 5/5 (West Supp. 1994)); 1967 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 1 (codified as amended at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715 (1988)); 1969 Minn. Laws 1129, art. 4, § 9 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 48.15(2) (Supp. 1993)); 1967 Mo. Laws, S.B. 1, § A (codified
as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105 (Vernon Supp. 1994)); 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 84, § I (codified as amended at Wyo. STAT. § 13-3-704 (1993)). The Alaska wild card
statute, however, was originally enacted in 1951. See Op. Alaska Att'y Gen., Nos. J99096-80, J-66-051-81, at 4 (Aug. 4, 1980) (citing 1951 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 129,
§ 2.104A (codified and later repealed at ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.005(3)(B) (1988)).
102. To respond to this threat, "many states enacted 'wild card' statutes ... [in order]
to foreclose the possibility at least in most states that national bank powers can be
suddenly expanded to the competitive disadvantage of state banks." AM. BANKER, Oct.
24, 1979, at 4 (quoting Paul Horvitz).
103. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen., Nos. J99-096-80, J-66-051-81, at 5 (Aug. 4, 1980).
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Thirty-nine states have passed statutes' intended to permit, to one
degree or another, their State Banks to engage in the same activities in
which National Banks are permitted to engage." 5 In addition to these
thirty-nine states, Georgia and Michigan have statutes that resemble
wild card statutes." 6 Montana's wild card statute provides a typical
formulation of a wild card provision:
With the consent of the [Montana banking] department, every
bank organized under the laws of the state shall have power to
and may engage in any activity or business in which such bank
could engage if it were operating as a national bank. The
department may prescribe, amend, and repeal regulations
affecting and controlling the exercise of the powers granted by
104. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18.1 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 06.01.020 (Supp. 1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-701(16) (Michie
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-2-103(5) (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.061
(West 1984 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-201 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 261101(3) (1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11) (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(b) (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.020(3) (Michie/BobbsMerrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:242(C) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 416 (West 1980); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 5-504 (1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15(2) (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-5-1(10) (Supp. 1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105(3) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-362
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.015(1)(f) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 394-A:6 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-25(12) (West Supp. 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-1-34(A)(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-38 (Supp.
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1125.23 (Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 203(5) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 706.795 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7, § 307 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-1 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110
(Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51A-2-14 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-601 (Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-113(a)(4) (West Supp.
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-10(1) (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 606 (Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5.1(A) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215
(West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 31A-3-2(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 220.04(8) (West 1994); WYO. STAT. § 13-3-704 (1993).
105. See STEPHEN K. HUBER, BANK OFFIcER's HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
§ 3.02[5] (1989) (noting that wild card statutes permit "locally chartered depository
institutions to undertake all activities permitted to nationally chartered institutions").
One of the most progressive states regarding liberalization of state banking powers has
been New York, which does not have a wild card statute. In certain areas, New York has
been ahead of National Banks in permitting its state banks to engage in commoditylinked or equity-linked transactions. See infra note 178 and accompanying.
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-61 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.451(31) (West
Supp. 1994). The Georgia Department of Banking and Finance and the Michigan
Financial Services Bureau do not consider their statutes technically to be wild card
provisions. Telephone Interview with Steven Bridges, Georgia Deputy Comm'r of
Banking (June 28, 1994); Telephone Interview with Russ Kropschot, Michigan Fin.
Servs. Bureau (June 15, 1994). Neither state has issued any rulings under their
respective statutes. Telephone Interview with Steven Bridges, Georgia Deputy Comm'r
of Banking (June 28, 1994); Telephone Interview with Russell Kropschot, Chief Deputy
Commissioner Michigan Fin. Servs. Bureau (June 15, 1994).
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this section, provided that.., such regulations and powers shall
not apply to activities which are expressly prohibited or limited
by the statutes of the state.'0 7

Although the various wild card statutes share the common goal of
granting parity between their State Banks and National Banks, they
vary considerably in their reach and their formulation.
B. Characteristics
Wild card statutes typically are not self-executing. Thirty-three of
the thirty-nine wild card statutes require express affirmative approval
08
from the state's banking regulator to engage in a wild card activity.'
Wild card statutes, however, are not nearly as uniform in other
respects.
The states are also non-uniform with respect to what the wild card
statute specifically authorizes. Eight states grant the same "privileges"
to their State Banks as National Banks enjoy.' 9 Twenty-one states
permit their State Banks to do the same "acts" or "activities" as permitted a National Bank."0 Five states only refer to a "power.""' Only

107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-362(1) (1993).
108. Only Arizona, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont do not
expressly require prior approval from the relevant state banking authority prior to
engaging in such activities. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184(2); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 307; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-1; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 7-3-10(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 606. Considering the risks associated
with exercising banking powers not expressly authorized, even in these states, State
Banks would probably want to confirm their understanding of the statute with their
respective state regulator prior to exercising such wild card powers. See infra notes 28091 and accompanying text.
109. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18.1; HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-201; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6:242(C); MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-5-1(10); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-A:6; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1125.23; UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-10; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 220.04(8).
Oregon's statute is phrased as "advantage of law" rather than "privilege." OR. REV.
STAT. § 706.795.
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184(2); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-701(16); IDAHO
CODE § 26-1101(3); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 91715(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.020(3); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 416; MD.
CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 5-504; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1362; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.015(1)(f); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-25(12); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 6-03-38; S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51A-214(2) (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-601; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5.1 (Michie 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215; W. VA. CODE § 31A-3-2(5)(B); WYO.STAT. § 13-3704. Texas refers to "transaction of affairs." TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342113(a)(4).
I 11. ALASKA STAT. § 06.01.020; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105(3); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-1-34 (referring also to "authority"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 203(5); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 606.
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ten states specifically reference a power of investment or ownership." 2
Furthermore, the states are not uniform in establishing a standard
for what constitutes a permissible national banking activity, in which
State Banks may then also engage under a wild card statute. For
example, twenty-two statutes specify federal law or legislation as
' 3
evidence of approval for a National Bank to engage in an activity.
Of those twenty-two, only fourteen refer to OCC regulations or
rulings." 4 Only two statutes refer to court rulings." 5 The remaining
states provide no reference to a particular authority for determining
what constitutes a permissible national bank activity in which State
Banks can also engage under a wild card statute.
The wild card statutes are also divided as to whether or not the wild
card provision expressly overrules a conflicting provision of state law.
Eighteen statutes expressly grant State Banks the same powers as
those possessed by a National Bank, even if such power would contravene state law.' 16 Nine state statutes expressly restrict wild card
activities to activities which do not contravene state law. ' The
112.

ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18.1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.061; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN ch.

205, § 5/5(11); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-38; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 307 (referring solely to investments); R.I. GEN. LAWS § .19-9-1 (same);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-113(a)(4); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 220.04(8).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.061; HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-201; ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B,
§ 416; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 5-504; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15(2); N.H. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 394-A:6; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-25(12); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-54;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-38; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1125.23; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,

§ 203(5); OR. REV. STAT. § 707.340; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1110; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-113(a)(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 606: VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-5.1(A); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215; W. VA. CODE § 31A-3-

2(5)(B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 220.04(8).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.061; HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-201; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-1715(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 416; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15(2); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-A:6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-54; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1125.23; S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-113(a)(4);
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5.1(A); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215 (rulings); W. VA.
CODE § 31A-3-2(a)(5)(B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 220.04(8). Louisiana refers only to
regulations. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:242(C).
115. HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-201(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1125.23.
116. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18.1; ALASKA STAT. § 06.01.020; FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 655.061; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:5-201; IDAHO CODE § 26-1101(3); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6242(c); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 5-504; MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-5-1(10); N.M. STAT.

ANN. § 58-1-34(A)(2)(b); N.D. CENT.CODE § 6-03-38; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1125.23;
OR. REV. STAT. § 706.795; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-1-110;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215; W. VA. CODE § 31A-3-2(a)(5)(B).
117. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 6-184; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-2-103(5); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 287.020(3); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15(2); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105(3);
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remaining twelve state statutes do not specify, or are ambiguous, as to
whether or not a wild card activity may be engaged in if it violates
another provision of state law." 8
Several wild card statutes directly address the question of branch
banking. For example, the Kansas statute expressly precludes the
state banking commissioner from authorizing state banks to conduct
branch banking." 9 In contrast, Missouri and Montana empower the
commissioner to enact regulations that would grant State Banks the
same branching powers of National Banks in their respective states. 20
A few states provide that a rule issued pursuant to a wild card statute
will expire if the legislature fails to codify it within a certain period of
time.'12
Finally, although promoting parity is the rationale behind wild card
statutes, only eleven states require a showing to the banking regulators
that the wild card activities are necessary in order to ensure parity or
competitive equality with a National Bank or to serve the public
convenience."'
C. Regulatory Interpretationof the Wild CardStatute
State banking regulators have varied radically in their willingness to
rely upon their state's wild card statute. In fact, nineteen states with
wild card statutes have not published any regulations, rulings, or
orders interpreting their statutes.123 Of the remaining states, the numMONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-362; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 307; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 51A-2-14(2); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-113(a)(4).
118. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-701(16); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 416;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.015(1)(f); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-A:6; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:9A-25(12); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 203(5); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-601;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-10(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 606(a)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.15.1(A); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 220.04(8); Wyo. STAT. § 13-3-704.

119. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(d). The Florida statute at one time also contained a
similar restriction. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-273, §1 (current version codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 655.061).
120. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-362(2).
121. IDAHO CODE § 26-1101(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1125.23; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6.1-5.1. In the one instance in which Idaho has acted under its wild card statute, the
next succeeding legislature codified the rule. The Kansas wild card statute requires that
the leaders of the legislature be notified of the action. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715(c).
122. ALA. CODE § 5-2A-7 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 06.01.020; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 655.061; IDAHO CODE § 26-1101(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6:121 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 5-504; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 362.105(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 706.795; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51A-2-14; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.215(3).
123. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Candon, Vermont Deputy Comm'r of
Banking, Dep't of Fin. Insts. (June 30, 1994); Telephone Interview with Steven
Cayouette, State Chief Banking Examiner, Rhode Island Dep't of Banking (Sept. 8,
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ber of published interpretations varies considerably. For example, the
Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance has
identified over 150 rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and
obligations of a National Bank that may be enjoyed by a Mississippi
state-chartered bank.' 24 More commonly, however, state banking
regulators have issued significantly fewer interpretations of their
respective wild card statutes. 125 The various state banking regulators
that have issued wild card rulings have most commonly considered
topics dealing generally with investment powers, activities, lending
limits, branch banking, and corporate governance matters.
1. Investments
State banking statutes are generally highly restrictive in providing
investment powers, limiting the ability of State Banks to make
investments in either debt obligations or equity securities.126 Banking
regulators, however, have been willing to expand this list based upon
those investments permitted National Banks. These investments typi1994); Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Ann Clark, Staff Attorney, Tennessee Dep't
of Fin. Insts. (July 1, 1994); Telephone Interview with Ronald Draughon, Supervisor of
Sav. and Loans, Utah Dep't of Fin. Insts. (June 27, 1994); Telephone Interview with
Richard A. Duncan, South Dakota Director of Banking (June 28, 1994); Telephone
Interview with Kenneth R. Ehrich, Supervising Bank Examiner, Colorado Dep't of Fin.
Insts. (June 28, 1994); Telephone Interview with Harold Feeney, Superintendent of
Banks, Arizona Banking Dep't (June 27, 1994); Telephone Interview with Julie Kidd,
Nevada Dep't of Fin. Insts. (June 27, 1994); Telephone Interview with William G.
Logan, Fin. Insts. Examiner 3, Alaska Dep't of Commerce (June 27, 1994); Telephone
Interview with Steven Lovejoy, Maryland Assistant Attorney General (July 25, 1994);
Telephone Interview with John A. Marzullo, Staff Attorney, Louisiana Dep't of Fin.
Insts. (July 1, 1994); Telephone Interview with Verne McKee, Supervising Examiner,
Oregon Div. of Fin. and Corp. Sec. (June 27, 1994); Telephone Interview with Sherman
Moen, Chief Examiner, Minnesota Dep't of Fin. lnsts. (June 30, 1994); Telephone
Interview with Colette Mooney, Deputy Superintendent of Banks, Maine Bureau of
Banking (June 30, 1994); Telephone Interview with Robert Reading, Assistant Comm'r
of Banking, South Carolina Board of Fin. Insts. (July 5, 1994); Telephone Interview
with Gary L. Ruby, Regulation Analyst, Hawaii Dep't of Banking (June 27, 1994);
Telephone Interview with James A. Russell, Principal Financial Analyst, Virginia Dep't
of Fin. Insts. (June 29, 1994); Telephone Interview with Laurie Schnarrs, Staff
Attorney, Pennsylvania Dep't of Banking (July 29, 1994); Telephone Interview with
G.R. Zachary, Assistant Director, Washington Dep't of Fin. Insts. (June 27, 1994).
124. See State Bd. of Banking Review, State of Mississippi, Reg. No. 2 (Nov. 29,
1993) [hereinafter Mississippi Reg. No. 2].
125. See, e.g., Orders of General Application for Florida Chartered Institutions (19
orders); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, div. 140, ch. 2 (13 rules); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§§ 11.1-.83 (1994) (23 rulings); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ Bkg. 3.001-.07 (Feb. 1994)
(eight rulings); Wyo. AUDIT DEP'T, Banking Div., chs. I-IV (1993) (four rulings).
126. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/32 (West 1993) (mandating that
debt securities must be investment grade), as amended by Pub. Act No. 88-546, 1994 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 317 (West).

374

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

cally relate to government favored or encouraged investments, or
activities directly related to a bank's operation. State banking regulators have permitted such investments, including: (1) investments in
the debt obligations of quasi-government entities;' 27 (2) certain equity
investments in quasi-government entities, the most popular being the
Federal Home Loan Bank; 21 (3) investments in small business
investment corporations; 29 and (4) investments in community development projects or corporations. 30 State regulators have also
127. See, e.g., Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive Letter No. 87-2
(Jan. 27, 1987) ("Sallie Mae" and "Fannie Mae"); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-07
(1981) (expired) (allowing investments in the Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae")). A National Bank is authorized pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by Riegle Community Development & Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2241. Mississippi and North
Dakota generally permit investments in all quasi-government agency debt securities
permitted National Banks. See Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 18, 20-22
(permitting investment in generally all quasi-government agency securities including
"Sallie Mae" and "Fannie Mae"); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 13-02-10-01 (1991) (allowing any
investments permitted National Banks).
128. See, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-2.035 (1991) (allowing investment in
Federal Home Loan Bank stock); Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive
Letter No. 90-10 (June 29, 1990) (same); Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No.
1990-3 (Nov. 19, 1990) (same). National Banks are authorized to make those
investments pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1426 (Supp. V 1993). Other authorized
equity investments include the Student Loan Marketing Association ("Sallie Mae") and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. See In re Investment in Student Loan
Mktg Ass'n Stock, Admin. Procedure No. 84-17-DOB (Fla. Dep't Banking & Fin. Aug.
17, 1984) (order of general application); Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos.,
Interpretive Letter No. 92-5 (May 14, 1992) (Sallie Mae and Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-6.063 (1988) (allowing
investment in the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation). Mississippi generally
permits equity investments in all quasi-government agencies permitted National Banks.
See Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 18, 20-22.
129. See, e.g., Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive Letter No. 93030 (Dec. 21, 1993); Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive Letter No. 862 (Oct. 24, 1986); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 22; TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit.
7, § 11.82(b). National Banks are authorized pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1988) and
12 C.F.R. § 7.7535 (1994). Vermont enacted a limited wild card statute in 1971
expressly to permit investment in small business investment corporations. See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1163 (1984).
130. See Arkansas State Banking Board, Investment in Community Development
Corporations, Amendment to Oct. 16, 1984 Resolution (Feb. 14, 1994); Mississippi
Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 17 (corporations); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-2.067
(1993); N.M. Fin. Inst. Reg. 93-2B (Nov. 8, 1993); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,.§11.83(g)
(1994) (projects and foundations); Wyo. Audit Dep't, Gen. Div., ch. 15, § 1 (filed Mar.
24, 1994) (community development project). Texas and Mississippi have also
authorized their State Banks to make charitable contributions. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 7, § 11.83(f); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 3. National Banks are
authorized to invest in community development projects or corporations pursuant to 12
C.F.R. pt. 24 (1994).
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permitted investments
in mutual funds 13' and investments in the stock
32
Banks.
of Bankers'
2. Activities
Regulators have permitted a broad array of activities under wild card
statutes. The most common expansion of activities has been to permit
a bank to directly lease personal property to its customers.13 The
various state banking regulators also authorize State Banks to engage

in other activities such as: (1) exercising various insurance powers;
13 1. See, e.g., In re Florida Chartered Commercial Banks Purchase of Shares of
Money Mkt. Mutual Funds (Fla. Dep't of Banking & Fin. Apr. 17, 1984) (order of
general application) (money market mutual funds); In re Florida Chartered Commercial
Banks Inv. in Open-End Inv. Co., Case No. 3236-B (Fla. Dep't Banking & Fin. Dec. 16,
1993) (order of general application) (other mutual funds); Kansas State Bank Comm'r,
Special Order No. 1987-1 (Jan. 26, 1987) (money market mutual funds); Mississippi
Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 19 (mutual fund shares); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 1406.055 (1987); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-18 (1987) (expired); Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§ Bkg. 3.06 (Feb. 1994) (investment company shares). National Banks are authorized
to make these investments pursuant to Banking Bull. No. 83-58 (Dec. 15, 1983); OCC
Banking Cir. No. 220 (Nov. 21, 1986).
132. Memorandum from Kenneth R. McCartha, Alabama Acting Superintendent of
Banks, to Chief Executive Officers of State-Chartered Banks (May 3, 1994); Mississippi
Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 17; Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Bkg. 3.01 (Feb. 1994) (permits
Bankers' Bank); cf. In re Florida Chartered Bankers' Banks Investment Powers (Fla.
Dep't of Banking & Fin. Nov. 21, 1983) (order of general application) (explaining
Bankers' Bank investment powers). A Banker's Bank is a bank that is owned
exclusively by other banks and is engaged exclusively in providing depository
institution related services for other banks. See FDIC, supra note 59, at 1. National
Banks are authorized pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) and 12 U.S.C. § 27(b)
(1988).
133. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1988-1 (Jan. 25,
1988); Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1976-2 (Dec. 20, 1976);
Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 8; Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-2.150
(1994); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-10 (1992) (expired); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Bkg.
3.05 (Feb. 1994); Wyo. AUDrr DEP'T, Gen. Div., ch. 1, § 3 (filed July 7, 1992); cf.
Illinois Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive Letter No. 93-027 (Dec. 15, 1993)
(allowing banks to lease real property to municipalities to same extent as National
Banks). National Banks are authorized to make such leases pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh), 12 U.S.C. § 371d (1988), and 12 C.F.R. § 23.7 (1994).
134. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1990-2 (Nov. 19,
1990) (granting 12 U.S.C. § 92 insurance powers); MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-2.051
(1994) (same); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 5-6 (same); Kansas State
Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1988-4 (Oct. 17, 1988) (may credit life insurance);
Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1988-4 (Oct. 17, 1988) (may sell fixed
rate annuities); State Bd. of Banking Review, State of Mississippi, Amended Reg. No. 2,
at 6 (1993) (same); Arkansas State Banking Bd., Sale of Title Ins. (Aug. 22, 1989). The
Tennessee Attorney General has opined that the Tennessee wild card statute also grants
certain insurance powers. Op. Tenn. Att'y. Gen., No. 89-69 (May 1, 1989), questioned
by Op. Tenn. Att'y. Gen., No. 92-34 (Apr. 16, 1992). The Montana Attorney General
has also opined that Montana State Banks may market fixed annuities pursuant to the
Montana wild card statute. 43 Op. Mont. Att'y. Gen., No. 76 (Nov. 16, 1990). See infra
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(2) receiving equity kickers;' 35 (3) dealing with real estate held as a
result of foreclosure; 36 and (4) acting in a variety of different
capacities, such as a tax preparer,' 37 mortgage servicer,' 31 postal
substation, 39 and others. 4°
3. Lending Limits
Several state banking regulators have liberalized lending limits
through their wild card statutes, primarily by changing the definition of
capital or surplus. 14 1 For example, Kansas has taken advantage of
notes 182-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the insurance powers held by
National Banks. National Banks are authorized to engage in such insurance activities.
See infra notes 182-86.
135. Equity kickers represent "a share in the profit, income or earnings from a
business enterprise of a borrower ... , in addition to or in lieu of interest." 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7312 (1994). Florida, Missouri, and Mississippi have authorized their State Banks
to receive equity kickers. In re Florida Chartered Banks-Loan Agreements Providing a
Share in Profits, Income or Earnings (Fla. Dep't Bank. & Fin. June 9, 1981) (order of
general application); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 17-18; Mo. CODE
REGS. tit. 4, § 140-6.050 (1994). National Banks are authorized pursuant to 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7312 (1993).
136. See Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 11-12; Kentucky Dept. of Fin.
Inst. Parity Letter No. 92-2 (1992); In re Florida-Chartered Banks-Expenditures Related
to Other Real Estate, Admin. Procedure No. 85-7-DOB (Fla. Dep't of Banking & Fin.
Jan. 14, 1985) (order of general application); Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order
No. 1988-3 (Apr. 18, 1988); New Mexico Fin. Inst. Div. Reg. 93-3B (Nov. 8, 1993).
National Banks are authorized to hold "other real estate owned" ("OREO") property
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 29 (Fourth) (1988).
137. See MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-6.056 (1994); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra
note 124, at 10. National Banks are authorized pursuant to 12 C.F.R. pt 24. (1994).
138. See In re Florida Chartered Banks Servicing of Mortgage & Other Loans as
Agent (Fla. Dep't of Banking & Fin. Oct. 5, 1982) (order of general application);
Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 11. National Banks are authorized pursuant
to 12 C.F.R. § 7.7379 (1994).
139. See TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 11.83(h) (1994); Kansas State Bank Comm'r,
Special Order No. 1975-2 (Nov. 17, 1975). National Banks are authorized pursuant to
12 C.F.R. § 7.7482 (1994).
140. See, e.g., Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 10 (debt collection); Mo.
CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-6.058 (1994) (same); id. § 140-6.059 (allowing operation of
Credit Bureaus); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 4 (same); id. at 4 (allowing
marketing of software); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 11.83(i) (1994) (allowing issuance of
payroll); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Bkg. 3.03 (Feb. 1994) (allowing data processing
services). National Banks are authorized pursuant to issue payroll pursuant to 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.7485 (1994); to be involved in debt collection through a subsidiary pursuant to OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 53, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,128 (June 27, 1978); to market software pursuant to OCC Interpretive Letter, 1987
WL 149776 (July 13, 1987); and to furnish data processing services pursuant to 12
C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1994).
141. See, e.g., Ark. State Banking Board Resolution (Jan. 19, 1988) (defining legal
lending limits); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-16 (1992) (expired); N.M. Fin. Inst. Div.
Reg. 93-lB (Nov. 8, 1993); Wyo. AUDIT DEP'T, Gen. Div., ch. 15, § 1 (filed Mar. 24,
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federal rules which implement substitute lending limits or capital
forbearance plans. 4 2 Regulators have also carved out lending activities that, under federal rules, do not constitute lending for lending limit
purposes. 43
'
4. Branch Banking
Regulators often have resorted to their wild card statutes to expand
branch banking. As National Banks were permitted to branch out on
1
an interstate basis pursuant to new interpretations of federal law,'
state banking regulators began to authorize their own institutions to
branch out in a similar manner. 45
5. Corporate Governance
State statutes frequently provide that State Banks are not eligible for
the more liberal corporate codes governing non-banking corporations. 46 Some state banking regulators, however, have looked to
1994) (surplus account). Capital and surplus for National Banks are defined at 12 C.F.R.
§ 3.100 (1994).
142. See Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1986-1 (May 22, 1986)
(adopting OCC substitute lending limits with regard to charged-off agricultural and oil
and gas loans); Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1986-2 (May 22, 1986)
(approving lower minimum capital requirement). The substitute lending rules for
National Banks are discussed infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
143. See In re Lending Limits, Admin. Procedure No. 3014-B (Fla. Dep't of Banking
& Fin. July 21, 1992) (order of general application) (lending to government entities if
loan constitutes general obligation of government not subject to lending limit); Illinois
Comm'r of Banks & Trust Cos., Interpretive Letter No. 92-17 (Dec. 8, 1992) (earn-out
portion of sale of state bank subsidiary financed by selling bank not subject to lending
limits); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-02 (1992) (expired) (IDB authorities not
borrower); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 11.81(d) (1994) (same); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 11.82(c) (1994) (stating that repurchase agreements are not borrowing obligations);
TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 11.81(c) (1994) (not applicable to accrued interest).
144. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
145. See Memorandum from Z. Thompson, Alabama Superintendent of Banks, to
Chief Executive Officers of State-Chartered Banks (May 31, 1990); In re State Chartered
Commercial Banks Statewide Branching (Fla. Dep't Banking & Fin. Nov. 17, 1988)
(order of general application); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124; Mo. CODE REGS.
tit. 4, § 140-2.126 (1994); Wyo. AUDIT DEP'T, Gen. Div., ch. 13, art. 3 (filed Nov. 13,
1993); cf. In re Establishment of Trust Representative Officers (Fla. Dep't Banking &
Fin. Jan. 12, 1981) (order general application) (permitted to establish trust
representative offices to the same extent as National Banks); Kentucky Dep't of Fin.
Inst., Parity Letter No. 92-3 (Aug. 23, 1993) (main office relocations).
146. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/3.05 (West 1993) (mandating that
banks may not be organized under the Illinois Business Corporation Act); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 805, § 5/13.05 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting foreign
corporations from dealing in banking); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-3 (Michie 1993)
(allowing corporations to be organized under the Business Corporation Act for any
lawful purpose except banking).
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what is typically a much more liberal national banking corporate code
in giving their banks greater flexibility. In addition, as National Banks
begin to convert to State Banks, the remaining National Banks will
push their regulators to liberalize their corporate codes so that their
corporate procedures and policies will not be disrupted.
Several state regulators have authorized important corporate powers
for their banks based upon the wild card statutes in their states. For
example, several states have granted some form of indemnification to
State Bank directors, officers, and employees. 147 Other states have
permitted their banks to pledge property, act as sureties or
guarantors, 148 expand their capacity to borrow money or issue preferred stock, 49 create subsidiaries, 5 ° avoid attachment prior to final
judgment,' 5 ' or utilize a particular form of merger. 152 State regulators
have also authorized other, less important corporate powers, including
the power to purchase life insurance policies for their officers,' 53 to

147. See, e.g., Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 2; New Mexico Fin. Inst.
Div. Reg. 92-IB (Feb. 11, 1992); Wyo. AUDIT DEP'T, Gen. Div., ch. VI, § 2 (filed Jan.
31, 1986). National Banks are authorized pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 7.5217 (1994).
148. See, e.g., Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 5; TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit.
7, § 11.83(b) (1994) (may act as guarantor). National Banks are authorized pursuant to
OCC Interpretive Letter, 1987 WL 149807 (Dec. 16, 1987) (may pledge investment
securities to secure borrowings); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7410 (1994) (may pledge assets to
secure public deposits); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7000 (1994) (guarantee own obligations); 12
C.F.R. §§ 7.7010, 7.7012 (1994) (guarantee obligations of others under certain
circumstances).
149. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-12 (1992) (expired) (preempting the
borrowing limitation); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:1-7-11 (1992) (expired). National
Banks are authorized to issue preferred stock pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 51a (1988).
150. See, e.g., Kansas State Bank Comm'r, Special Order No. 1988-3 (April 18,
1988) (may create subsidiaries to hold foreclosed property); Mississippi Reg. No. 2,
supra note 124, at 19 (may create operating subsidiaries); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 11.82(a) (1994) (may create operating subsidiaries); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Bkg. 3.04
(Feb. 1994) (operate through subsidiaries). National Banks are authorized to operate
subsidiaries pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1994).
151. See, e.g., In re State-Chartered Banks-Attachments, Injunctions and Executions,
Admin. Procedure 2854-B (Fla. Dep't of Banking & Fin. Nov. 30, 1990) (order of
general application); Rules of Okla. Banking Board IV-19 (1991), invalidated by
Morrow Dev. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 816 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1991).
For a discussion of Morrow Dev. Corp., see infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
152. See In re State-Chartered Banks Reorganization by Reverse Triangular Mergers
(Fla. Dep't of Banking & Fin. May 28, 1982) (order of general application). National
Banks are authorized pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 215, 215a, 215b, 215c (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
153. See, e.g., Bank Purchases of Life Insurance, Arkansas State Banking Board
Resolution (Aug. 15, 1991); Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 7; TEX. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, § 11.83(c) (1994). National Banks are authorized to provide insurance for
bank officers pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 7.7115 (1994).
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establish rules on shareholder or board meetings,154 to establish5 rules
6
regarding qualifying shares,15 5 and to remain open on Saturdays.
Despite the above uses, the number of published rulings issued
pursuant to a particular state's wild card statute is relatively low in
proportion to the number of states that have adopted wild card
statutes.157 In the future, state banking regulators will continue to be
faced with obstacles in expanding wild card powers.
V.

POTENTIAL OF THE WILD CARD STATUTE

As national banking powers expand, there are several other areas in
which State Banks can achieve parity with National Banks. State
Banks, however, will remain forced to overcome resistance from state
banking regulators before regulators will authorize their banks to
exercise such powers.
National and State Banks continue to make headlines as they begin
to exercise non-traditional banking powers. 5 8 Although National
Banks have been permitted to exercise a variety of new powers, many
State Banks have yet to receive authorization to do so. State banking
regulators, however, could close the gap quickly in this area through
the use of existing wild card statutes.
A. FinancialDerivatives
Probably the greatest potential use of a wild card statute currently
lies in the area of financial derivatives.'5 9 Financial derivatives are
defined as "financial instruments which derive their value from the
154. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 11.83(j) (1994) (shareholder action without
meeting); id. tit. 7, § 11.83(k) (board action without meeting). National Banks are
authorized to act in this way pursuant to OCC Interpretive Letter No. 524 (Oct. 1990).
155. See, e.g., Mississippi Reg. No. 2, supra note 124, at 2; OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 1301:1-7-06 (Oct. 13, 1980) (expired). National Banks are governed by 12 U.S.C.
§ 84 (1988) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4210 (1994).
156. See Idaho Bank Rule No. 1 (Dec. 22, 1992). The Idaho ruling appears to be in
response to a ruling that federal law preempts Idaho's statute that required National
Banks to close on Saturday. Idaho v. Security Pac. Bank Idaho, 800 F. Supp. 922, 92324 (D. Idaho 1992) (citing OCC letter authorizing National Banks to remain open on
Saturday).
157. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S. Regulators Shift Attention to Banks' Risk,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 1994, at B4C (discussing regulation of derivative activity).
159. The use of financial derivatives has expanded greatly over the last decade. See
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Er AL., DERIVATIVE PRODUCT ACTIVrTIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
(1993) [hereinafter JOINT STUDY]; GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND
PRINCIPLES (1993).
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performance of assets, interest or currency exchange rates, or
indexes."' 16 "Derivative transactions include a wide assortment of
financial contracts, including structured debt obligations, deposits,
swaps, futures, options,6 caps, floors, collars, forwards, and various
combinations thereof."' '
Banks earn revenues from derivative activities through "transaction
fees, bid-offer spreads, and their own trading positions."' 162 Banks
may also earn fees by offering customers risk management tools
through the use of financial derivatives. 163 In addition, banks may use
financial derivatives to lower their cost of funding and to reduce
undesirable exposure to interest rate changes or currency fluc-

tuations. 164

Banks control approximately seventy percent of the off-exchange
derivatives activities. 65 Although National Banks have been autho-66
rized for several years to engage in financial derivative activities,'
with the exception of New York,' 67 there appears to be little published
guidance for State Banks. Ten banks, or their affiliates, accounted for
approximately ninety percent of bank derivative activity with respect to
interest rate contracts as of September 1992.168 Six of these ten banks
Banks, and the remaining four were New York State
were National
69
Banks.

160. Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, Banking Circular No. 277, 5 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 58,717, at 36,459 (Oct. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Circular No.
277].
161. Id.; see also JOINT STUDY, supra note 159, at 1-5 (providing a general
introduction to derivative products). For a glossary of many of the common terms in the
derivative area, see id. at app. III.
162. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 159, at 6.
163. See id.
164. Circular No. 277, supra note 160, at 36,459; see JOINT STUDY, supra note 159,
at 6.
165. Jeffrey Taylor & Steven Lipin, SEC, Six Firms Work to Set Derivative Rules,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at Cl. At the end of 1992, the 50 largest National Banks had
derivative exposure for interest rate contracts of approximately $50 billion. See GROUP
OF THIRTY, supra note 159, at 59. Derivative exposure represents the replacement costs
for these contracts. Id. For a discussion of bank credit exposure from derivative trading,
see Lyn Perlmuth, The Derivatives DangerDefined?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1994,
at 211.
166. National Banks Are Advised on Participationin the Financial Futures and
ForwardPlacement Markets, Banking Circular No. 79, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,539 (Apr. 19, 1983).
167. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
168. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 159, at 11.
169. Id. The six National Banks (or their affiliates) were Citicorp, BankAmerica,
Chase Manhattan, First Chicago, Bank of Boston, and Continental Bank, N.A. Id. The
four New York State Banks were Chemical, J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust, and Bank of New
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The OCC has permitted National Banks to engage in financial
derivative activities in accordance with "safe and sound banking practices,"'"7 and has put into place substantial regulations dealing with the
use of derivatives."' Financial derivatives not only include transactions involving interest rates, but also include transactions linked to
commodity prices, equity prices, or indexes in which all or a portion
of the return is linked to either such prices or an index of such
prices."
OCC Banking Circular 277 prescribes extensive guidelines covering
derivative activities, including rules regarding senior management and
board oversight of derivatives' activities, credit risk management,
liquidity risk management, and operations and systems risk
management.' 73 The OCC bases its guidelines on a bank's level of
York. Id. Continental Bank has since converted into an Illinois State Bank. See Lipin,
supra note 85, at B6B.
170. Circular No. 277, supra note 160, at 36,460. The OCC permits a National Bank
to use derivatives for the following purposes: (1) to manage financial risk for its own
account; (2) to lower its cost of funding; (3) to exploit arbitrage opportunities across
financial markets; and (4) to engage in the trading of, and dealing in, derivatives on
behalf of customers. Id. at 36,459.
17 1. Regulators are also contemplating additional rules. See Bacon, supra note 158,
at B4C (discussing regulators tailoring examinations to match derivative risks); Barbara
A. Rehm, Delay Seen in Swaps Disclosure Regulations, AM. BANKER, June 9, 1994, at I
(discussing regulators requiring banks to expand disclosure of derivative activities);
Taylor & Lipin, supra note 165, at CI (relating that the SEC is negotiating voluntary
standards with derivatives dealers).
172. See OCC Interpretative Letter, 1992 WL 125220 (Mar. 2, 1992) (allowing
unmatched commodity index swaps managed on a portfolio basis); Bank to Act as
Principal in Unmatched Commodity Price Index Swaps, OCC No Objection Letter No.
90-1, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,095, at 71,219
(Feb. 16, 1990) (allowing banks to expand swap activities to include acting as
principals in unmatched commodity index swaps); National Bank Acting as Principal in
Commodity Price Index Swaps with Customers, OCC No Objection Letter No. 87-5,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,034, at 76,638 (July 20,
1987); OCC Interpretive Letter, 1988 WL 282282 (Aug. 8, 1988) (permitting a
certificate of deposit product which pays interest at a rate based in part upon changes in
the S&P 500). The OCC has also agreed that "National Banks may engage in physical
commodity transactions in order to manage the risks arising out of physical commodity
financial derivative transactions." Circular No. 277, supra note 160, at 36,466; see also
OCC Interpretive Letter 632, 1993 WL 639335 (June 30, 1993) (concluding that
hedging financial exposure from activities involving commodities is permissible);
Letter from William P. Bowden, Jr., supra note 60.
173. Circular No. 277, supra note 160. The OCC provides additional guidance
regarding the interpretation of Circular No. 277 in OCC Bull. No. 94-31, 1994 WL
194290 (May 10, 1994). The OCC also intends to issue detailed examination procedures
regarding derivative activities. Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Sept. 8, 1994, at A1. The Federal Reserve Board has also provided similar but less comprehensive
guidelines for examination of derivative activities. See Risk Management of Financial
Derivatives, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. SR 93-69 1 58,717, at 36,467 (Dec. 20,
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activity, taking into account whether the bank is a dealer, an active
17 4
position taker, or a limited 7end-user.
Congress is also contem5
regulation.
additional
plating
No state appears to have enacted express statutory authority permitting a State Bank to engage in financial derivative transactions to the
same extent as National Banks. In fact, the Kansas Attorney General
has opined that a Kansas State Bank does not have the power to enter
into financial derivative transactions. 76 The Kansas Attorney
General's opinion, however, recognized that the Kansas wild card
statute may arguably have granted authority to the Kansas Bank
Commissioner to authorize such activity."7
At least two states expressly authorize derivative activities to some
extent. The bank regulatory authority for New York has authorized
several different types of derivative activities.' Illinois also appears
1993).
174. Circular No. 277, supra note 160, at 36,461. The Joint Study refers to them as
"end-users" and "intermediaries" (or "dealers"). JOINT STUDY, supra note 159, at 5.
175. Kenneth H. Bacon & Greg Hitt, Derivatives Face New Regulation From
Congress, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1994, at A4 (discussing Rep. Markey's announcement
that he will introduce a bill to regulate derivatives); Bill Introduced to Regulate
Derivative-Instruments Use, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1994 at C6 (relating that Senator
Riegle introduced bill to regulate derivatives); Randall Smith & Steven Lipin,
Beleaguered Giant: As Derivative Losses Rise, Industry Fights to Avert Regulation,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al (generally); Rep. Leach Introduces Derivatives Bill
for All Financial Institutions, End-Users, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5 at 168
(Feb. 4, 1994) (discussing Leach bill).
176. The Kansas Attorney General opined that a State Bank could not enter into
interest futures and forward placement contracts, a form of financial derivatives. Op.
Kan. Att'y Gen., No. 82-68, 1982 WL 187557, at *1 (Mar. 16, 1982).
177. The Attorney General's office refused to rule on the reach of the wild card statute
in this area because it was "unaware of any decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court or
prior opinions of this office construing the scope and extent of the general powers
granted the Commissioner by this [wild card] statute" and because the issue was "not
presented for our consideration." Id. at * 11.
178. New York has granted such authority based upon a bank's incidental banking
powers. See Letter from David T. Halvorson, First Deputy Superintendent, Banking
Dep't, State of New York, to Edmund P. Rogers III, Esq., Senior Vice President and
Resident Counsel, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Aug. 11, 1989)
(opposing commodity linked activities); Letter from David T. Halvorson, First Deputy
Superintendent, Banking Dep't, State of New York, to Anthony J. Horan, Vice President
and Counsel, Bankers Trust Company (Nov. 14, 1988) (stating that commodity related
financing activities are permissible under New York law); Letter from Carmine M.
Tenga, Deputy Superintendent of Banks, Banking Dep't, State of New York, to Guy C.
Dempsey, Vice President and Counsel, Bankers Trust Company (July 16, 1992)
(approving of commodities investments); Letter from Carmine M. Tenga, Deputy
Superintendent of Banks, Banking Dep't, State of New York, to Guy C. Dempsey, Vice
President and Counsel, Bankers Trust Company (Nov. 20, 1991) (approving of
commodities investments).
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to have recognized an incidental power for its State Banks to hedge
their interest rate
risk through the use of interest rate swaps and similar
79
instruments.1
A wild card statute provides an opportunity for a state banking
regulator to authorize the use of financial derivatives at varying levels
of activity based upon the authorization granted to National Banks by
the OCC. Failure to authorize such use could deprive a State Bank of
an important tool for managing interest risk or of the opportunity to
generate additional revenue. By relying on the guidelines developed
by the OCC, a state banking regulator may take advantage of the
limitations and the controls that the OCC has already developed.
B. InsuranceActivities and Annuities
Insurance activities of all types provide another important area in
which to apply a wild card statute.18 0 Both large and small banking
institutions generally "consider insurance the easiest and likely the
18 1
most successful area for small as well as large institutions to enter."
Although some states have granted insurance powers either expressly
or through their wild card statutes, the potential remains for other
states to use wild card statutes to authorize insurance powers.
National Banks have been authorized, in certain circumstances, to
sell various types of insurance 8 2 despite Congress' general delegation
of regulating the insurance industry to the states pursuant to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'83 For example, National Banks generally
179. See ILLINOIS COMMISSIONER OF BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES, STATEMENTS OF
POLICY § 4.05, at 4-6 (1991). Section 4.05 requires that all such derivative transactions
be for "hedging purposes rather than speculation" and "must be kept within the legal
investment limitation permitted by the Illinois Banking Act." Id.
180. For a general discussion of the interaction between insurance and banking, see
Fischer, supra note 29, at 771-821.
181. Barry A. Abbott et al., Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 BuS. LAW. 1005,
1005 (1988).
182. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected Arkansas' attempt to
regulate a National Bank's sale of debt cancellation contracts (basically credit life
insurance), holding that state insurance laws were preempted to the extent they
conflicted with incidental banking powers granted to National Banks. First Nat'l Bank
of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 778 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990).
For a discussion regarding the future of debt cancellation contracts under either National
Bank or wild card authorization, see Nathaniel E. Butler, Comment: Official Confusion a
Brick Wall to Debt Cancellation Contracts, AM. BANKER, Aug. 6, 1993, at 17.
183. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988). For a discussion of the continuing battle
of banks with state regulation, see Philip C. Meyer, Banks Gird for New Fight in
Congress over Insurance Powers, 12 Banking Pol'y Rep. (P-H) No. 17 at 5 (Sept. 6,
1993).
Insurance subsidiaries of bank holding companies generally may engage in insurance
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have the power to sell and underwrite insurance related to the extension of credit, such as credit 8 life
insurance,18 4 municipal bond
185 and title insurance.1 6
insurance,
Section 92 of the National Bank Act also authorizes National Banks
to sell fire, life, and other types of insurance in cities with fewer than
5,000 people. 8 7 The OCC has attempted to expand the reach of
Section 92 beyond communities of 5,000.188 The Second and Fifth
89
Circuits, however, have firmly rejected these attempted expansions.'
activities to the extent permitted by applicable law or the National Bank Act. See
generally Fischer, supra note 29 (summarizing law relating to insurance powers and
bank holding companies). For a discussion of the Federal Reserve Board's insurance
regulation, see Abbott et al., supra note 181.
184. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); 12 C.F.R. § 2 (1994) (allowing the sale of
credit life, credit health, and accidence insurance); National Bank Allowed to Acquire
Subsidiary Engaged in Underwriting, as Reinsurer, Credit Life Insurance, OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 277, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,441, at 77,596 (Dec. 31, 1983).
185. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding
the regulation); Issuance of Standby Letters of Credit by Subsidiary to Support
Municipal Bond Issues, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 338, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,508, at 77,790 (May 2, 1985).
186. See Bank May Act as Agent in the Sale of Title Insurance Incidental to Its
Express Authority to Make Loans Secured by Real Property, OCC Interpretive Letter No.
368, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,538, at 77,836
(July 11, 1986); Title Insurance Policy Activities of Operating Subsidiary of National
Bank, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,601, at 77,901 (Feb. 6, 1987).
187. Section 92 provides that:
[A]ny such association [national bank] located and doing business in any
place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants ...
may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller
of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company
• . . by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies
issued by such company.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The United States Supreme Court recently
upheld this interpretation in United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents
of Am., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993). For a general discussion of National Bank
insurance powers, see generally Abbott et al., supra note 181.
188. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1968) (relating the OCC approval of the application of Citizens & Southern
National Bank to sell broad forms of automobile, home, casualty, and liability
insurance); National Bank May Sell Insurance to Customers Residing Outside Small
Town Where Its Main Office or Branch is Located, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366,
[1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536, at 77,833 (Aug. 18,
1986); OCC Ruling No. 7110 (1963) (codified at Banks & Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7100
(1994)) ("may act as agent in the issuance of insurance incident to banking
transactions").
189. The Second and Fifth Circuits contend that Section 92 creates a statutory
prohibition on National Bank insurance activities in cities with more than 5,000
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In contrast, a recent decision by the District of Columbia Circuit
approved an OCC expansion of Section 92 by holding that Section 92
imposes no geographical limitation on the activities of a National
Bank's insurance agency located in a town of fewer than 5,000
people.' 90 The OCC ruling presents the possibility that National
Banks could open branches in cities with populations of fewer than
5,000 people, then use these branches to market their insurance
activities over a wider geographic area.' 9'
Both National Banks and State Banks are also interested in selling
annuities, a financial product similar to insurance, 92 because of the
potential profit that could be made from the activity.' 93 The OCC has
permitted National Banks to sell annuities in communities with populations greater than 5,000, asserting that annuities are not insurance and
should not be subject to Section 92 limitations. 94 The United States
Supreme Court has recently upheld this practice, holding that the
persons. See American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1992)
(prohibiting National Banks from selling title insurance in cities with more than 5,000
people), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993); Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012 (5th Cir. 1968)
(overruling OCC Rul. 7110). But see Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding
general insurance powers outside of Section 92); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v.
Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980)
(permitting a subsidiary of a National Bank to sell certain kinds of insurance).
190. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366, supra note 188 (concluding that Section
92 places no geographical limitation on the insurance activities of a national bank in a
town of fewer than 5,000 persons); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, 997
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366).
191. See Arthur D. Postal, OCC Chase Stratagem Exploits Insurance Rule, FDIC
WATCH, Oct. 11, 1993, at 1; David W. Roderer, Viewpoint: Congress Should Defer
Action on Bank Annuity Sales, AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 1993, at 12.
192. Annuities generally provide for a variable or fixed payment payable over a fixed
term or for life. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 90 (6th ed. 1990). See also Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 2121 (1994).
For a discussion of annuities, see Jonathan B. Cleveland,
Comment, Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke: A Second Look at
National Bank Annuity Sales and 12 U.S.C. § 92, 78 MINN. L. REV. 911, 926 n.79
(1994).
193. See Kalen Holliday, Banks Benefit from Stampede to Insurance Products, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 24, 1993, at 13 (stating that banks anticipate strong future growth); see
also Supreme Court is Next Stop in Legal Dispute over Bank Annuities, Banking Pol'y
Rep. (P-H) No. 18, at 7 (Sept. 20, 1993) (stating that "billions of dollars are at stake"
over whether National Banks are permitted to sell annuities); Karen Talley, Courts Leave
Banks in Limbo on Right to Market Annuities, AM. BANKER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 12
(relating that annuities generated $450 million in fee income for banks in 1992).
194. See National Banks May Participate in Brokering of Variable Annuity
Contracts, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,501, at 77,773 (Apr. 4, 1985); National Bank Permitted to Sell
Annuity Contracts, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,090, at 71,210 (Feb. 12, 1990).
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"brokerage of annuities is an 'incidental power ... necessary to carry
on the business of banking"' for a National Bank. 195 The Court
further noted that annuities are not insurance under Section 92.1%
Sixteen states, seven of which are not wild card states, currently
authorize State Banks or their subsidiaries to engage in insurance
brokerage activities. 97 Although fourteen other states suggest that
their wild card statutes would authorize such activities,' 98 only four of
these states appear to have actually published regulations or rulings
providing such powers. 9 In addition, only three states expressly
authorize the sale of annuities.2 °°
C. Investments in Quasi-GovernmentAgencies
Congress has periodically authorized National Banks to make equity
investments in a variety of quasi-government agencies. 2 ' Due to
typically stringent restrictions on the ability of State Banks to purchase
debt and equity investments, investments in such agencies often
require either express statutory authorization or regulatory approval. 0 2
Wild card statutes may be used, however, to permit State Banks to
invest in quasi-government agencies.
The power to purchase stock in the Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation ("Farmer Mac") provides an example of an investment
that may be authorized through a wild card statute.20 3 Farmer Mac is a
federal agency created in 1988 to develop a secondary market for farm
real estate loans.2 4 Congress intended that both National and State
195. NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 (1995)
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
196. Id. at 814-15.
197. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 13, at 14-15.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 134.
200. See supra note 134.
201. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, 108 Stat. 2241 (Agricultural Credit Corporation); 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (1988)
(Federal Home Loan Bank); 12 U.S.C. § 1718(d) (Supp. V 1993) (Federal National
Mortgage Association); Purchase of Preferred Freddie Mac Stock by National Banks,
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 577, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
83,347, at 71,489 (Apr. 6, 1992) (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation).
202. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, §§ 5/33, 5/35 (West 1993) (listing
permitted investments in debt securities).
203. Farmer Mac was created pursuant to the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1687 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2279aa-l(a)(l)
(1988)).
204. H.R. REP. No. 295(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2740-41.
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Banks purchase stock in Farmer Mac.2" 5 The Farmer Mac legislation,
however, did not specifically permit either National Banks or State
Banks to purchase stock in the agency. Consequently, the OCC
issued a letter specifically granting National Banks the power to purchase stock in Farmer Mac.20 6 States have been slower to respond,
however; only nine state legislatures have expressly empowered their
State Banks to invest in Farmer Mac. 2° '
Reacting to this slow response, commentators have suggested that
state banking regulators could utilize wild card statutes to give State
Banks the power to invest in Farmer Mac without the need for express
legislative approval.20 8 Missouri, in fact, has already authorized an
investment in Farmer Mac through its wild card statute. 209 By looking
to their wild card statutes, other state banking regulators also could
easily and quickly expand the types of investments their State Banks
could make, avoiding the often arduous process of obtaining legislative approvals.
Similar arguments could be made for State Banks to invest in other
government favored investments in which National Banks are permitted to invest, such as small business investment companies, 210 national
housing partnerships, 21 housing development corporations, 2 2 and
205. Authority of National Banks to Purchase Security in the Federal Agricultural
Mortgage Corporation, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 427, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,651, at 78,031 (May 9, 1988) ("A number of other
provisions in the Agricultural Act indicate that Congress intended that all types of
financial institutions purchase the stock of Farmer Mac ... .
206. See id.
207. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:5-305; IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.901 (West 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1101; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.61 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 8-148 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-47.4 (Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 806 (West Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51A-4-26
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-60.1 (Michie Supp. 1994). Neither Nebraska nor Iowa has
a wild card statute.
208. Weldon Barton of the Independent Bankers Association of America suggests
that wild card statutes might empower state banks to purchase equity in Farmer Mac. See
Robert M. Garsson, Comptroller Says National Banks Can Buy Stock in Farmer Mac,
AM. BANKER, May 11, 1988, at 14.
209. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 140-6.063 (1988).
210. Small business investment companies ("SBIC") are generally companies that
provide equity capital for small business concerns. See Small Business Investment Act
of 1985, 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-697c (1988 & Supp. V 1993). National Banks are authorized
to invest in SBICs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7535 (1994).
211. See OCC Banking Circular No. 21, [1966-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,264 (Jan. 14, 1970).
212. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103325, 108 Stat. 2241.
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state housing corporations." 3
D. Lending Limits
The power of a State Bank to lend an amount equal to what it would
be permitted to lend as a National Bank provides a powerful tool for
regulators to assist State Banks unable to lend to customers during
depressed business cycles due to decreases in such banks' capital.
Although lending limits may constitute one of the more prominent
aspects of a state's banking code,214 the power to alter that limit may
enable state banking regulators to assist their banks to compete with
National Banks.
A lending limit is the maximum amount that a bank may lend to its
customers and is generally expressed as a percentage of the bank's
capital.1 5 A lending limit also tends to reflect a regulator's deter216
mination of how much a bank can safely lend to a single customer.
Lending limits typically range between ten percent and twenty-five
percent of a bank's capital. 217 Even if the percentages are uniform,,
however, lending limits may differ depending upon the definition of
,capital. 2t 8
Congress has generally provided that a National Bank can lend up to
fifteen percent of its capital to a customer on an unsecured basis.21 9
Congress, however, has delegated to the OCC the power to prescribe
rules and regulations "to establish limits or requirements other than
213.

Id.

214. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205,

§

5/32 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 221.29 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
215. See Joanne R. Hicken, Substitute Lending Limits in Excess of the Statutory
Lending Limit: The Regulators Have the Power, 107 BANKING L.J. 38, 38 (1990).
216. See id. at 44; see generally Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An
Argument for a Uniform Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1985)
(discussing policies behind lending limits); Kenneth J. Rojc, National Bank Lending
Limits-A New Framework, 40 Bus. LAW. 903 (1985) ("'The protection and regulation of
national bank finances, rather than the imposition of restrictions on borrowers, has
been recognized as the principal aim of the lending limit laws.").
217. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.48(2), (5) (stating that an unsecured
obligation may not exceed 10% of capital); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/32

(stating that unsecured loans may not exceed 20% of capital); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A61, 17:9A-62 (West 1984) (stating that unsecured loans may not exceed 10% of capital);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-507(b) (West Supp. 1995) (unsecured loans may not
exceed 25% of capital). See generally PROFILE, supra note 3 1, at 221-225 (summarizing
state lending limits).
218. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.100 (1994). Both Illinois and New Mexico liberalized their
lending limits by conforming their definition of capital to that used by National Banks.
See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/2 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. Reg. 93-lB (Nov. 8,
1993).
219. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
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those specified. ' 220 By granting the OCC the power to alter a lending
limit, Congress intended to enable the OCC to quickly adjust its
lending limit regulations to fit business conditions.12' The OCC has
adjusted limits under this power in response to the agricultural and
energy crisis of the 1980s.222
State Banks will be unable to provide the same level of service to
their customers if they are unable to lend the same amount as a
National Bank can lend, either because of substitute lending limits or
differing interpretations of capital. As the OCC adjusts its lending
limit, state banking regulators must provide the same flexibility to their
State Banks. A wild card statute provides a unique response to enable
state banking regulators to adjust their lending limits to enable State
Banks to compete with National Banks.
Several states have concluded that their wild card statutes should be
interpreted to encompass the power to lend the same amount that a
National Bank can lend. 23 There are several arguments, however,
why wild card statutes might be interpreted as not permitting expansion of the lending limits applicable to State Banks. First, it could be
argued that wild card statutes operate only to authorize the lending
activity itself. If a State Bank is already authorized to engage in an
activity, subject to limitations established by state statutes or regulations, then the wild card statute should not enable that bank to exceed
its state law-based limitations. Second, critics could argue that wild
card statutes were not intended to reach a matter so important to the
safety and soundness of a banking institution as lending limits.
Typically, a lending limit is not a prohibition on what a bank can do,
but rather a demarcation of the extent to which it can do the activity
without endangering the safety and soundness of the institution.224
This argument, however, suggests that the OCC
has authorized unsafe
225
limits.
lending
adjusting
by
banking practices

220.

Id. § 84(d)(1).

221. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3079-81 (delegating authority to OCC to enable OCC to respond to
"economic conditions and financial practices"); see also National Banks' Lending
Limits, Request for Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,303 (final rule codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 32.8 (1994)) (discussing delegation of lending limit authority to the OCC).
222. See Lending Limits, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,641 (1986) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.8
(1994) (providing a substitute lending limit for banks with agricultural or oil and gas
loans).
223. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
225. For a discussion of sound banking practices, see infra part VI.B.
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VI. CONSTRAINTrS ON EXPANDED WILD CARD USAGE

Although wild card provisions provide a solution to many problems
facing state bank regulators and legislatures, serious policy issues and
political constraints remain. It will be necessary, therefore, for state
legislatures and policymakers to resolve these issues, in addition to
encouraging use of their wild card statutes, before any measurable progress in the use of wild card statutes will result.
A. Limitations on Wild Card Use
Regulators and legislators alike must determine the extent to which
their wild card statutes are intended to authorize State Banks to engage
in activities that may be permitted for National Banks, either now or in
the future. State Bank regulators will continue to encounter tough
questions about the potential reach of their wild card statutes as
National Banks are empowered to act in ways that could be considered
to contravene state law or policy. 6
1. Limitations Potentially Imposed by State Laws
Twenty-seven wild card statutes expressly address whether a state
banking regulator may issue a wild card ruling in contravention of state
law.227 Unfortunately, however, even regulators expressly authorized
to contravene state law may resist issuing such a ruling, in fear that a
court would find that a legislature lacked the authority to delegate such
power. Several of the states which permit contravention provide that
such rulings will expire after a certain period of time unless the
legislature takes action. 228 As a result, State Banks that may be authorized by the state banking authority to engage in certain activities may
decide to await legislative action before commencing these activities, or
even making investments to develop them.
Twelve wild card statutes provide no guidance as to whether a
banking commissioner is entitled to issue a ruling in contravention of
state law.229 In these states, regulators may be reluctant to contravene
state law for fear that either a court or the legislature may determine
that the regulators have overstepped their authority.

226. Under Illinois law, for example, investment securities that a State Bank may
purchase must be rated by a rating agency. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/33 (West
1993). No such express rating requirement is imposed on National Banks.
227. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
228.

See supra note 116.

229. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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The extent to which a state's legislature, by enacting a wild card
statute, can expressly or by implication authorize its bank regulatory
agency to contravene other conflicting provisions of state law, varies.
Alaska, Illinois, and Oklahoma are representative of the various state
interpretations of their respective wild card statutes.
2. Limitations Imposed by State Attorneys General
Three Attorneys General opinions issued from 1980 and 1981
narrowly interpreted their respective state wild card statutes. In 1980,
the Alaska Attorney General opined that without an express grant from
the legislature, the Alaskan wild card statute at that time did not
empower Alaska's banking commissioner to issue rulings in contravention of state law. 230 This case was easy, however, because earlier
drafts of the statute had contained language, which
was subsequently
23
removed, authorizing the commissioner to do so. '
In 1980, the Illinois Attorney General read the Illinois statute 232 very
restrictively, taking the position that the only effect of Illinois' wild
card statute is to permit State Banks to own small business investment
company stock that National Banks are permitted to own.233 The
opinion, however, appears to be colored by the Attorney General's
efforts to narrow the wild card statute in order to protect Illinois'
branch banking restrictions.234
The Illinois Attorney General has also considered whether the
Illinois wild card statute permits an Illinois State Bank to charge
interest in excess of amounts permitted under Section 4 of the Illinois
Interest Act, 235 as National Banks were permitted to do. 236 The
230. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen., Nos. J99-096-80, J-66-051-81 (Aug. 4, 1980).
Alaska's legislature since that time has added "notwithstanding" language to that state's
wild card statute that provides that its wild card statute may contravene state law. Op.
Alaska Att'y Gen., No. J-66-321-81 (Feb. 19, 1981).
231. Id.
232. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11) (West Supp. 1994).
233. 1980 Op. Ill. Att'y Gen., Nos. 70, 72 (Apr. 15, 1980).
234. The Illinois Attorney General noted that there was a "strong public policy
against branching by banks," and that if such restrictions were to be repealed, the
Illinois General Assembly should do it expressly (which it did in 1993). Id. The Illinois
Attorney General's opinion probably should be considered to have been implicitly
overruled by the Illinois Appellate Court in Town & Country Bank of Quincy v. E. & D.
Bancshares, 527 N.E.2d 637 (I11. App. Ct. 1988), which interpreted the Illinois wild
card statute as authorizing actions as well as ownership. See infra notes 283-84 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case. The opinion also appears to have
ignored the 1969 amendments to the Illinois statute that substantially broadened its
reach. See infra note 252.
235. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 815, § 205/4 (West 1993).
236. 1974 Op. I11.Att'y Gen., No. 82 (Feb. 14, 1974).
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Attorney General opined that the phrase "notwithstanding any other
provisions of [the Illinois Banking] Act, contained in that state's wild
the provisions of a
card statute, 237 was not intended to override
238
separate act, such as the Illinois Interest Act.
3. Judicial Rulings
More troubling is an opinion by the Oklahoma Supreme Court that
struck down a wild card ruling promulgated by the Oklahoma Banking
Commission. The Oklahoma Banking Commissioner formulated a
rule 239 pursuant to the Oklahoma wild card statute24° which paralleled
Section 91 of the National Bank Act.24' Section 91 provided that a
National Bank was not subject to attachment or execution until after the
National Bank had exhausted all of its appellate remedies. 242
Relying on the Commissioner's wild card ruling, the Tulsa County
District Court stayed execution of a judgment against an Oklahoma
State Bank.243 On appeal, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the "[liegislature may not delegate to an administrative agency
the power to amend or subvert a statute through administrative rules
and regulations." 2 "
237. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
238. 1974 Op. I11.Att'y. Gen., Nos. 82, 84-86 (Feb. 14, 1974).
239. Rules of the Okla. Banking Board IV-19 (1991).
240. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 203 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
241. 12 U.S.C § 91 (1988).
242. Id. Section 91 specifically provides that "no attachment, injunction, or
execution, shall be issued against [a National Bank] or its property before final
judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, county, or municipal court."
Id.; see also United States v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1989) (precluding creditors
from filing abstracts of judgment until receiving a final judgment), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1072 (1990); United States v. Lemaire, 826 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that National Banks are not subject to execution until after appellate remedies are
exhausted), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988); Glad v. Thomas County Nat'l Bank, No.
87-1299-C, 1991 WL 261712 *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 1991) (holding that National Banks
are not required to post supersedeas bond until final judgment); William E. Deitrick &
Christian A. Johnson, National Banks and Section 91: Protection from Judgment
Creditors Pending Appeal, 112 BANKING L.J. 325 (1995); Letter from Peter Liebesman,
Assistant Director, Bank Operations and Assets Division, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, to L. Roger Boord, Esq., Kirkland & Ellis (July 30, 1993) (supersedeas
bond requirement directly conflicts with 12 U.S.C. and is preempted). But see United
States v. Theos, 709 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding that judgment creditor not
precluded by Section 91 from filing judgment lien); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. McCrossen,
635 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App.) (holding a judgment creditor is not precluded from filing
lis pendens), cert. denied, 639 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1994).
243. Morrow Dev. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 816 P.2d 537 (Okla.
1991); see OKLA. R. App. P. 1.13.
244. Morrow Dev. Corp., 816 P.2d at 537 (citing Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd. v. Welch, 446 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1968)); cf. Utah League of Insured Say.
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Perhaps limiting the impact of this decision on other jurisdictions is
the fact that the Oklahoma wild card statute does not expressly permit
banking regulators to adopt rules in contravention of Oklahoma
banking law. It is unclear whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would have reached the opposite conclusion had "notwithstanding"
language been present. 245 The Oklahoma Supreme Court might also
have arrived at a different result had the statute that was overridden
been a banking statute as opposed to a rule of civil procedure.'l
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court resisted what the court perceived to be the use of power to amend or subvert a statute, it is
arguable whether any Oklahoma law was either amended or subverted.
The Oklahoma state legislature made the policy decision that Oklahoma
State Banks should enjoy the "powers ... conferred upon [N]ational

[B]anks" by enacting its wild card statute,247 thereby implicitly
repealing any state law that conflicted with such policy.
4. Addressing State Law Limitations
One probable fear of states that have failed to enact wild card
statutes, and even of those states that have already enacted wild card
statutes, is the apparent authority granted to the state banking regulator. The enactment of a wild card statute might be interpreted to
constitute a grant to the state banking regulator of the authority to issue
rulings under the wild card statute in contravention of state law. At
least in those states where the legislature has expressly delegated to the
state banking authority the power to ensure that the activities permitted
Ass'ns v. Utah, 555 F. Supp. 664, 671-74 (D. Utah 1983) (finding an impermissible
delegation under Utah Savings & Loan Association wild card statute). The Utah decision
has been sharply criticized by commentators. See HUBER, supra note 105, at 3-12 ('The
Utah Savings decision can easily be distinguished in subsequent cases because the court
stated in its opinion that the decision should be read narrowly and because of the
adoption of specific legislation declaring that enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is
contrary to public policy in Utah."); Gregory J. Pulles, Constitutionality of State Parity
Statutes, 39 Bus. LAW. 1275, 1277 (1984) (generally critiquing Utah decision's
reasoning).
245. See supra note 118 for a listing of state wild card statutes that do not expressly
provide for, or are ambiguous about, whether a ruling may be adopted notwithstanding
conflicting state law.
246. For a discussion of an Illinois Attorney General opinion making a similar
distinction regarding the Illinois wild card statute and the Illinois Interest Act, see supra
notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
247. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 203 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); HUBER, supra
note 105, at 3-12 (discussing validity and importance of state legislative decisions to
adopt future federal rules); Pulles, supra note 244, at 1277 ("It seems unreasonable to
require the state legislature to act each year to effectuate this legitimate policy of
competitive equality.").
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of State Banks should match those of National Banks,2m any wild card
rulings by that state banking authority should be entitled to deference.
On the federal level, Congress has frequently delegated similar
substantive rule making authority to federal agencies.24 9 Courts have
generally upheld such rule making authority, provided that the agency
follows congressional intent in issuing such regulations.25 ° State
courts apply similar guidelines.2'
Although the concern relating to the broad authority of state banking
regulators under wild card statutes is significant, it would be difficult
to place State Banks on a competitive footing with National Banks in
the absence of such implicit authority. For example, the only way to
grant lending limit parity would be to adopt a limit different from that
expressly authorized by the legislature. Legislatures must assess
whether they need to amend their wild card statutes to clarify their
statutes' reach and the extent of authority each statute gives to state
248. See supra note 116.
249. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 93a (1988) (delegating rule making authority to OCC
with respect to National Banks); I.R.C. § 469(1) (1994) ("The Secretary shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this
section."). These agencies often act in a "legislative capacity when implementing and
administering the statutory schemes Congress entrusts to them." Robert J. Gregory,
When a Delegation Is Not a Delegation: Using Legislative Meaning to Define Statutory
Gaps, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 725, 732 (1990); see also JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.70 (1991) (discussing validity of legislative regulations
issued by IRS).
250. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989) ("[S]o
long as Congress provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions
such that a court could 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' no
delegation of legislative authority entrenching on the principle of separation of powers
has occurred." (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989))); United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 (1958) ("Rather than being a delegation by
Congress of its legislative authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing adoption
by Congress . . . of such unpreempted offenses and punishments as shall have been
already put in effect by the respective States for their own government."); American
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (It is "constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,
and the boundaries of this delegated authority.").
251. See, e.g., Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1119 (Md. 1977)
(holding that delegations of legislative power ordinarily do not violate the principle of
separation of powers when sufficient safeguards are provided), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117
(1978); General Assembly of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982) (stating that it is
commonplace for legislative standards governing an administrative agency to be
expressed in broad, general terms, on the assumption that the agency will implement its
enabling legislation through the adoption of more detailed standards). At least one court
has refused to apply a wild card statute relating to the Savings and Loan industry because
the legislative history of the statute "strongly illustrates that the legislation did not
intend to affect the Washington law governing enforcement" of the statute in question.
Perry v. Island Say. & Loan Ass'n, 684 P.2d 1281, 1288 (Wash. 1984).
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B. Safety and Soundness Considerations
State banking regulators may resist resorting to their wild card
statute on grounds that such an expansion of state banking powers
may endanger the safety and the soundness of their financial institutions. Regulators may point to earlier financial disasters that they
view as the results of banking power expansions.253 Regulators may
suggest that weaker banks are more likely to take advantage of
expanded banking powers in their efforts to improve profits. 25' Regulators may also cite the recent substantial losses from financial
derivatives suffered by commercial banks and their customers as an
example of the dangers of expanding banking powers.255
Evidence on the benefits of diversifying a state's banking activities
by expanding banking powers is mixed. Commentators and empirical
studies have suggested that expanding the activities may result in more
profitable and efficient banks. 6 Critics of these studies, however,
suggest that the results, in practice, may be much different based upon
difficulties banks may have in funding or in managing these new
252. Illinois, in fact, broadened its statute in 1969 in an effort to expand use of its
wild card statute. Pub. Act No. 76-1826, 76th Gen. Ass., 1969 I1. Laws 4025 (codified
as amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5 (West Supp. 1994)). Alaska added
"notwithstanding" language to broaden the reach of its statute. See supra note 230 and
accompanying text.
253. One commentator has noted that "[sipecifically, one of the lessons of the thrift
crises of the 1980s is that it is foolish to give new powers to nearly or already insolvent
institutions with little or no experience in the new activities and with ample incentives
to take risks at the deposit insurer's expense." Robert E. Litan, Interstate Banking and
Product-Line Freedom: Would Broader Powers Have Helped the Banks?, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 521, 539 (1992).

254. See id. at 539-40.
255. See GAO REPORT, supra note 159, at 39-40 ("concerns exist that size,
concentration, and linkages increase the risk to firms and markets"); J. Arnold, Better
Safe Than Sorry, ENERGY RISK, April 1994, at 1 (discussing how regulators are trying to
avoid market disaster stemming from derivatives); cf. R. Myers, Is This How Banks Sell
Derivatives, GLOBAL FINANCE, May 1994, at 37 (discussing financial risk of derivatives
to bank customers).
256. See Peter Eisemann, Diversification and the Congeneric Banking Holding
Company, 7 J. BANK RES. 68 (1976) (comparing stock price and dividend data for
selected banks and nonbanks); Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 319-30 (1987); Arnold Heggestad,
Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Bank Holding Companies, 27 J.
ECON. & Bus. 219 (1975) (comparing profitability of banking and nonbanking
industries); Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A
Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 720, 729 (1984)
(combining activities based upon portfolio theory may reduce risks).
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activities. 25
Safety and soundness concerns with respect to wild card statutes,
however, should be kept in context. First, by definition, National
Banks already engage in these "new" expanded activities, providing a
state regulator with a history of the effect of such activities on an institution's health.
Second, National Banks may already be exercising such expanded
powers in the very jurisdiction of state regulators. There is some
evidence suggesting that failing to grant a financial institution the
powers that its competition already exercises may actually make the
institution weaker as it struggles to compete. 58
Third, a State Bank exercising wild card powers remains subject to
the same restrictions and regulations currently in place for National
Banks.259 In authorizing extended powers, the OCC has already
determined that these activities are safe and sound practices for
National Banks, and has issued appropriate safeguards to prevent
endangering the safety and soundness of the National Banks.2 ° State
regulators will thus have a ready reference point to use in determining
how far they should go in expanding a particular banking power.
Finally, if a regulator is concerned that only certain of its institutions
are capable of exercising a particular power in a safe or sound manner,
the regulator may limit its approval to State Banks meeting certain
conditions. For example, a regulator could require that a State Bank
meet certain capital requirements prior to trading financial derivative
products. 26 A regulator may also require evidence that the State Bank
has sufficient expertise in the activity before granting its approval.
C. BureaucraticInertia
State Banks awaiting authorization of wild card powers may
encounter many of the same obstacles that organizations or individuals
often face from bureaucracies when requesting permission to perform
257. Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An
Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314, 353-71 (1990)
(describing the hazards of inefficient funding and management upon diversification).
258. Beatty, supra note 67, at 31.
259. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
260. The OCC has the power to terminate unsafe or unsound banking practices. 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (HOLA provision); id. §§ 1818(a), (b), (e) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (FDIA provisions); see Malloy, supra note 25, at 723 (discussing
federal regulatory agencies' powers).
261. OCC Circular No. 277 already imposes different requirements upon National
Banks engaging in derivative activities, depending upon the extent of their activity.
See Circular No. 277, supra note 160.
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a restricted activity. Almost all of the wild card statutes require
approval from their respective banking regulators before State Banks
may engage in a new wild card activity,262 yet State Banks may face
resistance to obtaining such powers from their banking regulator. 63
The current minimal use of wild card statutes by state banking regulators is probably evidence of this inertia.'
Initially, a state banking regulator may perceive few rewards from
granting wild card powers. For example, if a state banking regulator
authorized a power to a State Bank under a wild card statute which
later proved unwise, the banking regulator would receive much of the
blame.265 Also, unilaterally expanding a banking power such as a
lending limit to equal that governing a National Bank, without the
express concurrence of the legislature, could result in serious political
repercussions for the regulator if a State Bank dangerously overextended itself. 266 Thus, after analyzing the costs and benefits of
taking action, a regulator may conclude that there would be little
advantage for the agency to gain from authorizing such wild card
activity, leading the regulator to avoid or to delay authorizing such
activities in the interest of institutional self-preservation.267
In addition, the "Bureaucratic Personality" often insists upon overly
strict conformity to the duties, rules, and regulations under which it
operates. 268 Regulators often resort to such formalism to avoid ever
having to make a decision. 269 As a result, a state banking regulator
262. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
263. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that one reason for the few rulings
made under the Illinois wild card statute was the conservative interpretation the Illinois
Banking Commissioner has given to the provision. Christine Winter, Insurance Door
is Left Ajar to Illinois Banks, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 1990, § 7, at 1.
264. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
265. Some bureaucrats are referred to as "conservers" that "tend to be biased against
any change in the status quo. It might harm them greatly and cannot do them much
good." ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 97 (1967).
266. See Hicken, supra note 215, at 44 ("Banking regulators accept this principal [of
risk reduction] and will be reluctant to relax the lending limit except in special
circumstances.").
267. Similar risk aversion behavior has been observed by commentators at the
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a
Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy
Formulation,47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529-31 (1990).
268. See JOHN P. BURKE, BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY 86 (1986) ("A literalist
interpretation and strict conformity to duties, rules and regulations, however, can take
such allegiance to dangerous extremes."); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 123-24 (1957); NICOs P. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND
BUREAUCRACY 55 (1967) ("The instrumental and formalistic aspects of the bureaucracy
become more important than the substantive ones.").
269. DOWNS, supra note 265, at 100 ("[R]igid rule-following acts as a shield
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may require such strict compliance with a wild card statute that it
becomes virtually impossible to satisfy its requirements. For example,
a statute that requires a showing that such power "serves the public
convenience or advantage ' 270 could be interpreted so strictly as to
prevent any authorization except for the most obvious examples.
Regulators often strive to preserve their powers and their auto" ' and may be reluctant to do anything that would result in
nomy,27
surrendering regulatory authority over state banking institutions.
Defaulting to federal regulation or OCC administrative opinions may
undermine, to some extent, the authority granted to a regulator to issue
rules and regulations governing such institutions. Deference to OCC
rulings could suggest that the OCC understands what is best for a State
Bank better than the primary state regulator. Such reasoning may
explain why regulators in nearly one-half of the states with a wild card
statute have been reluctant to employ it in any situation.272
Commentators appear to have ignored the current and the future
effects of bureaucratic inertia when they describe the impact of wild
card statutes on the banking system. Professors Henry Butler and
Jonathan Macey have argued that wild card statutes may have already
lessened the political pressure for regulators to grant increasingly
greater banking powers.273 They argue that because states will
immediately respond to innovations at the federal level through their
wild card statutes, National Banks will have little incentive to lobby for
expanded bank powers because they will have to share such benefits
with State Banks.274
Butler and Macey's argument assumes, however, that state banking
regulators actually, or automatically, respond to federal innovations
through wild card statutes. 275 The contrary has been true; nearly onehalf of the wild card states have issued no rulings with regard to their
wild card statutes 276 and the remaining
states, excluding Missis278
sippi, 277 have issued few interpretations.

protecting them from being blamed for mistake by their superiors.
270. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
271. BURKE, supra note 268, at 91.
272. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
273. See Butler & Macey, supra note 84, at 706.
274.
275.

Id.
Kenneth Scott makes the same assumption in arguing the opposite point.

Scott, supra note 16, at
276. See supra note
277. See supra note
278. See supra note

36.
123 and accompanying text.
124 and accompanying text.
125 and accompanying text.
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Butler and Macey also argue that National Banks may not seek new
powers because of the possibility that a State Bank may be granted
similar powers.27 9 This argument also assumes that a State Bank
would be automatically granted National Bank powers. It further
assumes that the only reason a National Bank seeks such powers is to
distinguish itself from a State Bank, an-unlikely conclusion based
upon banks' drive to expand the services that they offer to customers.
D. What Constitutes a NationalBanking Power?
An important issue that state legislatures or banking authorities must
resolve is what constitutes a national banking power or activity. As
explained above, wild card statutes, in general, may inadequately
describe who defines what constitutes a national banking power.28°
Due to the multiplicity of statutory, administrative, and judicial authorities that directly or indirectly define the scope of national banking
powers, it may be unclear what a state legislature intended its banking
regulators to rely upon in authorizing wild card activities.
The definition of national banking power under a wild card statute
may be particularly important to a National Bank that is converting into
a State Bank. 28' A converting National Bank would argue that if the
OCC permits an activity, either in writing, orally, or implicitly, the
Bank should be permitted to engage in a similar activity as a State
Bank. This continuity of activity would minimize the disruption of the
services or activities in which a National Bank could continue to
engage after its conversion to a State Bank.
Wild card statutes may base state banking powers on national
authorities including federal statutes and court decisions, as well as
OCC regulations, rulings, and interpretations. None of the wild card
statutes, however, expressly refers to all of these authorities. Many of
the wild card statutes, in fact, do not expressly refer to any authority,
but instead grant only a general power to do what a National Bank is
empowered to do.282
There is little judicial authority interpreting the question of what
constitutes national banking power. An Illinois appellate court appears
to have decided that an "act of Congress" specified in the Illinois wild
card statute283 includes OCC regulations and rulings, as well as court
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See Butler & Macey, supra note 84, at 706.
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/5(11) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
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decisions.'8 4 Another Illinois appellate court noted that the Illinois

wild card statute "merely adds all powers possessed by national
Banks, as restricted by Federal law. ' 8
The OCC issues many different types of interpretations of the
National Banking Act. First, Congress has specifically authorized the
OCC to promulgate regulations. 8 6 In addition, the OCC regularly
issues rulings, circulars, bulletins, and various types of interpretive
and no-objection letters. 287 All of these documents are generally
available to the public.zs
The FDIC also issues interpretations defining what constitutes a
national banking power for the purposes of Section 303 of the FDIC
Improvement Act.289 In deciding what constitutes a permissible
activity, the FDIC has ruled that a State Insured Bank may look to
OCC interpretations in addition to federal statutes: "Activities expressly authorized by statute or recognized as permissible in
regulations, official circulars or bulletins issued by the [OCC] or in
any order or interpretation issued in writing by the [OCC] will be
accepted as permissible for state banks.,, 290 The FDIC has also issued
a pamphlet for State Banks that lists the equity investments and
activities which are permissible for National Banks.29 '
E. LimitationsImposed by the FederalReserve Board
As discussed above, the Federal Reserve Board has certain powers
that may enable it to restrict State Banks from engaging in a wild card
activity.292 The Federal Reserve Board may be hesitant, however, to
preclude a State Bank from engaging in an activity that it might
otherwise consider too risky or inappropriate, if National Banks are
already engaged in such an activity. Nevertheless, there are several
284. Town & Country Bank of Quincy v. E. & D. Bancshares, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 637,
641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
285. Estate of Lindberg v. Beverly Bank, 388 N.E.2d 148, 155 (Il. App. Ct. 1979).
286. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
287. See OCC Adopts a Staff No-Objection Procedure, OCC Banking Circular 205,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86,314, at 90,973 (July 26,
1985) (discussing OCC no-objection letters).
288. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.15 (1994).
289. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
290. 12 C.F.R. § 362.2(b) (1994).
291. FDIC, supra note 59. The lists are very comprehensive and should serve as an
excellent tool for both state banks and state regulators. The OCC has also proven a
useful source of information on this topic, independently issuing a ruling for a State
Bank that had written for clarification for purposes of Section 24 of the National Bank
Act. See Letter from William P. Bowjen, supra note 60.
292. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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circumstances in which the Federal Reserve Board has acted to limit
the ability of State Member Banks to engage in an activity, despite the
fact that National Banks are permitted to engage in the activity. For
example, a State Member Bank must apply to the Federal Reserve
Board for permission to enter into commodity or equity-linked transactions293 29
even though National Banks are allowed to engage in such
activities.
The Federal Reserve Board also restricts State Member Banks from
engaging in certain commercial paper placement activities in which
National Banks are permitted to engage.295 The Federal Reserve
Board will not permit a State Member Bank to "provide any letter of
credit or other guarantee arrangement in an effort to make the paper
more acceptable in the market" for commercial paper that it places.296
In contrast, the OCC takes a more pragmatic approach in approving
limited credit enhancement of commercial paper placed by National
Banks.297
F. Limitations Createdby Risk of DirectorLiability
The risk of personal liability faced by directors of State Banks may
provide a further limitation on the effectiveness of wild card statutes in
achieving parity between State Banks and National Banks. When
deciding whether to authorize wild card activities, a State Bank's
directors may consider whether the activities would create risk of
director liability. For example, states commonly have a statute that
holds a director personally liable for the bank's breach of a lending

293. 12 C.F.R. § 208.128 (1994). Commodity-linked or equity-linked transactions
are transactions "in which a portion of the return is linked to the price of a particular
commodity or equity security or to an index of such prices." Id. § 208.128(b) (1994).
294. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
295. Both the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC permit commercial banks to place
commercial paper. See Commercial Paper Activities of Bankers Trust Company of New
York Do Not Constitute Underwriting Securities, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
86,270, at 90,823 (June 4, 1985) [hereinafter Commercial
Paper]; Bankers Trust Third Party Commercial Paper Placement Activities Would Be
Authorized by National Banking Laws, OCC Interpretative Letter No. 329, [1985-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,499, at 77,763 (Mar. 4, 1985)
[hereinafter OCC Commercial Paper Letter].
296. See Commercial Paper, supra note 295, at 90,835.
297. See OCC Commercial Paper Letter, supra note 295, at 77,764, 77,766-67 n.6;
Standby Letters of Credit May Be Provided by National Banks in Connection with Their
Private Placement Advisory Services, OCC Interpretative Letter No. 212, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,293, at 77,448 (July 2, 1981); see
also MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS AC'TVrnES OF BANKS AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 148-50 (1993).
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limit or investment limitation. 29 If the wild card statute permitted such
a breach, banking activity consistent with the wild card statute could
potentially create director liability.
None of the wild card statutes appears to provide guidance on this
issue. It would be inconsistent, however, for a state statute to impose
director liability for an activity expressly permitted by a wild card
statute in the same state. Arguably, the offending statute would have
been impliedly repealed upon the issuing of a ruling by the respective
state banking regulator regarding such banking power under the wild
card statute. Banks, however, may seek written assurance from their
respective banking authority prior to engaging in an activity that may,
on the face of the statute, impose director liability.
VII. MODEL STATUTE

A survey of the thirty-nine wild card statutes reveals that they are
neither similar nor uniform. 299 Each of the statutes appears to leave
certain questions unanswered as to how they should be interpreted.
State legislatures should thus review their wild card statutes and
determine what is restraining regulators from approving wild card
powers.
The following is a model statute that would eliminate many of these
concerns:
Additional Banking Powers
1. Construction. The purpose of this section is to ensure parity
between those banking powers permitted National Banks and
those permitted State Banks.
2. Parity. The Banking Commissioner may adopt such
regulations or rules granting a bank organized under this
chapter any power as may now or hereafter be conferred upon a
national banking association with its principal place of business
in this state, subject to the same restrictions and limitations
imposed on such national banking association with respect to
such power. If any power of a national banking association is
terminated or modified, the Banking Commission may terminate
or make a similar modification to any corresponding power
granted pursuant to this section.

298. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1994, Pub. Act. No. 88-636, 111. Legis. Serv. 1762
(codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 205, § 5/39(a) (West 1994)) (holding directors
personally liable for breaches of investment and lending limits). The Illinois statute
has been read by courts to impose virtually strict liability for any such breach. See
Colchester State Bank v. McIntyre, 577 N.E.2d 897, 899 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
299. See supra notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
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3. Other Statutes. Any such grant of power shall be in addition
to, and not in limitation of, any other provision of this chapter
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary. The proper
exercise of any power authorized by this Section shall not result
in the imposition of personal liability upon any director, officer,
employee or agent.
[Optional Paragraph 3]
3. Other Statutes. The Banking Commission may not
authorize any power prohibited by the laws of this state.
4. Definition of Power. For purposes of this section, "power"
means any banking or corporate power, right, benefit, privilege,
or immunity of a national banking association as set forth in
any Federal statute or any regulation, ruling, circular, bulletin,
order, or interpretation issued by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency or by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
Paragraph one provides a rule of construction for the banking
regulator, expressly encouraging the regulator to authorize wild card
powers. 3°° A similar result could be achieved by an equivalent statement in the legislative history.
Paragraph two ensures that regulators may authorize powers not
only currently exercisable by National Banks, but also those powers
that may be authorized in the future. It also permits regulators to
adjust those powers based upon changes to national banking powers.
Paragraph three provides legislatures with a choice as to whether or
not they will authorize a regulator to issue a ruling that may contravene
state law. 30 ' An express statement to such effect is important to avoid
future confusion or litigation on the issue. Legislatures should also
consider clarifying the effect of the statute regarding
such issues as
3°
30 3
branch banking, 30 2 insurance, and lending limits.
In the event that a power may be granted in contravention of state
law, paragraph three clarifies that the exercise of such power will not
impose personal liability upon any director, officer, employee, or
agent of the State Bank.30 5
Paragraph four defines "power" broadly to permit a State Bank to
engage in the same activities and to make the same investments as
300. See supra part VI.C for a discussion regarding current problems with reluctant
regulators.
301. See supra part VI.A for a discussion of current varied responses to this question.
302. See supra part IV.C.4.
303. See supra part V.B.
304. See supra parts IV.C.3 and V.D.
305. See supra part VI.F.
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permitted a National Bank. 306 The definition also ensures that a State
Bank can benefit from any protections extended to a National Bank
and any rules relating to the corporate governance.3 "7 In addition,
paragraph four clarifies the statutory, regulatory, or administrative
authorities that define a national banking power, avoiding uncertainty
as to whether a particular issuance is authoritative for purposes of a
wild card statute.30 8 By also specifying the authorities issued by the
FDIC, in addition to those of the OCC, the regulator is able to benefit
from the work previously done by the FDIC in interpreting Section
303.309
VIII. CONCLUSION

Wild card statutes provide a unique solution to enable State Banks to
compete and to maintain parity with National Banks. Although the
majority of the states have enacted wild card statutes, few state
banking regulators have exercised the full extent of the authority given
to them under these provisions. As National Bank powers continue to
expand, State Banks should petition their respective regulators to
authorize the banking powers that wild card statutes provide. State
Banks risk losing important opportunities to expand their business and
to better serve their customers if they are unable to compete in all
aspects with National Banks.
Legislatures should consider clarifying their wild card statute to
ensure that State Banks receive all of the powers that the legislature
intended them to exercise. The model statute presented 310 suggests
some important provisions generally missing from most wild card
statutes that would ensure that State Banks receive the full benefit of
their respective state's wild card statute.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra part V.A-C.
See supra part IV.C.5.
See supra part VI.D.
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
See supra part VI.

